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INTRODUCTION
Today, as constitutionalism spreads around the globe, it is em-
bodied de rigueur in written documents: even places that sustained
polities for centuries without a written constitution have begun to suc-
cumb to the lure of writtenness. 1 America, we think, spawned this
t Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. I am very grateful for the comments of
participants in the Cornell, Fordham, and UCLA Law Schools' Faculty Workshop Series;
the Stanford Legal Theory Workshop; the workshop of the USC Center for Law, History
and Culture; the University of Pennsylvania Constitutional Law Workshop; the Boston Uni-
versity Legal History Workshop; the University of Arizona Faculty Enrichment Series; the
seminar on Constitutionalism sponsored by the Institute for Constitutional Studies at
George Washington University Law School; and the American Society for Legal History
panel on "Unusual Origins in American Legal History." I owe a particular debt to conver-
sations with, and feedback from, Mary Bilder, Ann Carlson, Carole Goldberg, Robert Gold-
stein, Abner Greene, Ariela Gross, Philip Hamburger, Amalia Kessler, Larry Kramer,
Douglas Kysar, Jerry Lopez, Jennifer Mnookin, Maximillian Novak, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gary
Rowe, Jed Rubenfeld, Hilary Schor, Avi Soifer, Jim Whitman, and Steve Yeazell. Last but
not least, Michael Page provided invaluable research assistance.
1 The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998, which incorporated the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, has generated something akin to a
bill of rights; however, the Honorable Lord Goldsmith has recently argued that even this
document is insufficient and that a written constitution is necessary. See Rt. Hon. Lord
Goldsmith, Keynote Address: Global Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1155 (2007). Addition-
ally, several Australian judges have recently contended that Australia should adopt a writ-
ten bill of rights. See Stuart Rintoul, Judge Calls for Right to Quash Unjust Laws, AuSTRALIAN,
Sept. 14, 2007, at 2, LexisNexis Academic.
Resistance to written constitutions does, however, remain in various quarters. For ex-
ample, although many Native American tribes adopted such documents pursuant to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, some insist that they remain unnecessary. See, e.g.,
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worldwide force, inaugurating a radically new form of political organi-
zation when it adopted the Constitution as its foundational text; yet
the notion of the written constitution had, in fact, received an earlier
imprimatur from the pen of Daniel Defoe-English novelist, political
pamphleteer, and secret agent.2 Plying his trades in the early eight-
eenth century, Defoe, now known largely as the author of Robinson
Crusoe, advocated the development of written documents setting forth
the basic principles of a governmental order-and restraining the
power of legislative majorities-in a number of disparate literary and
political guises. Just as the individualist ethos of Robinson Crusoe
grabbed the American imagination from the mid-eighteenth century
onward, a conception of written constitutionalism similar to the one
that he promulgated took root on American soil. This Article elabo-
rates the contours of written constitutionalism that Defoe outlined
and demonstrates the close alignment of some of Defoe's arguments
with the scholarship of today, an alignment that suggests the persis-
tence of some of the mythic ideals of written constitutionalism. that
Defoe constructed in the early eighteenth century.
Examining Defoe's work provides, in addition, insight into the
vexed relationship between written constitutionalism and judicial re-
view, a conceptual pair often-and perhaps inappropriately-con-
flated. Perennial debates about the legitimacy of Chief Justice John
Marshall's declaration of judicial review under the Constitution in
Marbury v. Madison have been infused with new vigor by recent work
reiterating the idea that judicial review and, in particular, judicial
supremacy, largely constitute post-constitutional American innova-
Deron Marquez, Chairman, San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, Address at the Executive
Session on American Indian Constitutional Reform Hosted by the Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation:
Why the San Manuel Band Doesn't Need a Constitution 2 (Oct. 18, 2002) (on file with
author) (stating that, "Historically, San Manuel has never seen the need for a written con-
stitution. Rather, our stability as a government has derived not from a written document
but from a number of other factors directly related to our Tribe's unique characteristics,"
including the "strong kinship systems and long-term cultural identity" that derive from the
tribe's small size); see also, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L.
REv. 1049, 1076-77 (2007) (referring to the ""'boilerplate' constitutions" adopted after
the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act").
Even at the time of the Founding, one writer lauded the Native Americans who had
inhabited Vermont for maintaining a successful government without a written constitution:
A modern statesman would smile at this idea of Indian government: And
because he could find no written constitution, or bill of rights, . . . pro-
nounce it weak, foolish, and contemptible. But it was evidendy derived
from the dictates of nature, and well adapted to the state and situation of
the savage.... The individual had all the security, in the public sentiment,
custom, and habit, that government can any where afford him.
SAMUEL WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF VERMONT 140-41 (Walpole, Thomas
& Carlisle 1794).
2 See generally PAULA R. BACKSCHEIDER, DANIEL DEFOE: HIS LIFE (1989); MAXIMILLIA1
E. NOVAK, DANIEL DEFOE: MASTER OF FICTIONS: HIS LIFE AND IDEAS (2001).
[Vol. 94:73
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tions.3 More dramatically, some writers cast doubt on the primacy of
judicial review by urging that the people themselves have been, and
should be, construed as a more powerful source of authority in consti-
tutional interpretation than the judicial branch.4 Partly in response to
these arguments, several scholars have elaborated upon the English
and American precursors to judicial review as we know it, demonstrat-
ing that the exercise ofjudicial review before Marbury was much more
common than previously recognized, and that colonial structures of
judicial appeal bore substantial resemblance to what would later
emerge as the practice of judicial review under the Constitution.
5
Mary Bilder's account of the origins of judicial review in the as-
sessment of whether corporate bylaws and ordinances-and later acts
of colonial legislatures-were repugnant to the laws of England fur-
nishes one of the most compelling attempts to show that judicial re-
view was far from unprecedented. 6  Colonial charters, which
contained language requiring that colonial laws not be repugnant or
contrary to English law, afforded a basis for Privy Council review of
the colonies' enactments. Still, Bilder's model of corporate judicial
review does not provide support for Chief Justice Marshall's emphasis
in Marbury on the idea that judicial review constitutes a unique entail-
ment of a written constitution. 7 According to Chief Justice Marshall,
the intent of "all those who have framed written constitutions" must be
to render them "the fundamental . . . law of the nation"; a legislative
3 For an analysis of how the conception of judicial review was transformed from an
exceptional and quasi-revolutionary activity into a regular practice of the U.S. federal judi-
ciary during the period leading up to Marbury, see Gordon S. Wood, The Origins ofJudicial
Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 787
(1999). For the contention that, at the time of Marbury, "judges could not expound funda-
mental law authoritatively," which entailed the idea that "judges could not rest the invalid-
ity of legislation on their interpretation of the Constitution over a contending legitimate
one embodied in that legislation," see Sylvia Snowiss, The Marbury of 1803 and the Modern
Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 237 (2003). See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTrrUTION (1990).
4 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 401 (2005) (elaborating on the dynamics of non-judicial constitutionalism in the early
Republic through a micro-historical study of the first Supreme Court case to strike down a
state law).
5 See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502
(2006); Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE "EXTENDED
REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA 25 (Ronald Hoffman & PeterJ. Albert eds., 1996); William
Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005) (finding
thirty-one cases preceding Marbury in which a statute was invalidated).
6 See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CUL-
TURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); Bilder, supra note 5; see alsoJOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (Octagon Books 1965) (1950) (com-
prehensively detailing the procedures of and cases heard by the Privy Council).
7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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act "repugnant to the constitution" must, therefore, be void.8 As
ChiefJustice Marshall insisted, "This theory is essentially attached to a
written constitution."9 Despite the firm assertion of these points, and
the repetition of the mantra "written constitution" no fewer than
seven times in the opinion, ChiefJustice Marshall provided few indicia
of why the fact of writing should be intimately linked with the possibil-
ity ofjudicial review; or, even more fundamentally, why writing a con-
stitution would itself be of value.
Simply invoking the concept of "fundamental law" does not suf-
fice to distinguish the Constitution sufficiently from its predecessors;
as John Reid, J.G.A. Pocock, and others have elaborated, the British
unwritten constitution had previously been seen as articulating princi-
ples of fundamental law as well. 10 Another passage in the Marbury
opinion does, however, indicate a somewhat different rationale for
valuing a written constitution: the notion that writing provides a use-
ful aid to memory. As Chief Justice Marshall explained,
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is writ-
ten. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is
that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time,
be passed by those intended to be restrained?"
The limitations upon legislative power do not derive from the written
quality of the Constitution, but are instead enshrined by it; the limita-
tions that have been defined are recorded in order to preserve them
for posterity and memory. From this scant basis provided by Marbuy,
advocates of constitutionalism have derived a strong faith in written
constitutions, one that has pervaded not only the scholarly literature
and popular imagination, but also resulted in the proliferation of writ-
ten constitutions during the twentieth century. ChiefJustice Marshall
8 Id. (emphasis added).
9 Id.
10 SeeJ.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 48 (W.W. Norton 1967)
(1957) (referring to "the building-up of a body of alleged rights and privileges that were
supposed to be immemorial .... coupled with the general and vigorous belief that England
was ruled by law and that this law was itself immemorial... result[ing] in turn in that most
important and elusive of seventeenth-century [English] concepts, the fundamental law");
JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LiB-
ERTY (2005); see also J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
15 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (1955) (noting that early references to "fundamental law" do
not necessarily refer to the "fundamental law" of today, but that some elements of the early
modern usage of the phrase may have developed into the contemporary usage).
Gordon Wood has also observed that "The idea of fundamental law embodied in a
written constitution by itself could never have accounted for the development of judicial
review; indeed, emphasis on the fundamental character of the Constitution tended to in-
hibit the use of judicial review." Wood, supra note 3, at 799.
11 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 94:73
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was not, however, the first to insist upon the significance of writing in
the constitutional arena, and he may not bear sole responsibility for
spawning the mythic status of written constitutionalism. As this Article
details, Daniel Defoe's writings in the earlier part of the eighteenth
century rely on and articulate their own range ofjustifications for writ-
ten constitutional or quasi-constitutional documents.
One caveat is in order: speaking of written constitutional or quasi-
constitutional documents might suggest that the term "constitution"
remained constant between the early-eighteenth-century England of
Defoe and the late-eighteenth-century context of the American
Founding. However, the word's signification experienced considera-
ble flux during the period. In 1776, Thomas Paine's Four Letters on
Interesting Subjects could maintain that written constitutions were the
only ones worthy of the name and could even deny the accuracy of
attributing a "constitution" to the English. 12 The possibility of this
stance would hardly have occurred to a political thinker of Defoe's
time. According to the predominant political meanings of that mo-
ment, "constitution" could designate the arrangement of govern-
ment-including the allocation of powers; something ordained or
instituted; or the fundamental principles protecting the liberty of the
subject.' 3 By presenting a variety of disparate appeals for something
like a written constitution, Defoe developed a new conception not
only of the significance of writing, but also of what a constitution
could be.
Part I argues that analyzing Defoe's political, literary, and histori-
cal works carries a variety of implications for understanding written
constitutionalism. There are three principal ways in which the exam-
ples provided by Defoe help to illuminate aspects of the history and
theory of written constitutionalism in three principal ways. First, De-
foe's compositions were widely read in late-eighteenth-century
America and may therefore have exerted a subterranean influence on
both the elites and the people themselves during the Founding Era; in
this respect, Defoe may have provided a precedent for the American
conception of the written constitution. Second, even absent such di-
rect influence, Defoe's version of written constitutionalism can be
seen as furnishing a cognate to the American vision because it arose in
response to somewhat similar circumstances, including the possible
replacement of monarchical sovereignty with legislative supremacy.
Finally, the differences between the account of written constitutional-
12 SeeTHomAs PAINE, FOUR LETTERS ON INTERESTING SUBJEcTS, Letter III, at 15 (1776)
("All constitutions should be contained in some written Charter; but that Charter should
be the act of all and not of one man."); id., Letter IV, at 18 ("The truth is, the English have
no fixed Constitution.").
13 See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 789-90 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "constitu-
tion"); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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ism that emerges out of Defoe's works and the claims made for written
constitutionalism today illuminate the contingency of what writing
may mean for constitutionalism and show the ways that mythic entail-
ments of writing are sometimes precisely that-myths. Furthermore,
examining cultural sources like the emergent eighteenth-century
genre of the novel (rather than the classical materials of historical
analysis) permits access to a broader public apperception of the ques-
tions involved in the creation of the Constitution. If inspecting the
writings of the Founders or looking at late-eighteenth-century legal
procedure provides insight into a certain subset of authors and audi-
ences for the Constitution, turning to the novel and other widely read
genres can grant access to the construction of the popular imagina-
tion during the Founding Period.
In Part II, the Article turns to the development of Defoe's politi-
cal stance against legislation in England and the colony of Carolina
that penalized those who refused to participate in Church of England
services or who engaged only in "occasional conformity" by depriving
them of the privilege of serving in various offices. Through these writ-
ings, a sense of the potential efficacy of a written constitutional or
quasi-constitutional document began to emerge. These texts re-
mained, however, on the level of critique, suggesting a succession of
means for stemming the flow of legislative power and protecting the
individual believer against incursions upon his or her faith.
Part III shifts focus to Defoe's later writings, including his novels
and the quasi-historical A General History of the Pyrates. Although seem-
ingly different in kind, these works bear a substantial relation to each
other: the novels sometimes represented themselves as histories or au-
tobiographies and A General History of the Pyrates partook more of the
historiography of Herodotus than the rigor of today's historians.
More importantly, however, these texts constructed a set of myths in
which writing played a central role. 14 If Defoe's political tracts re-
mained critical (while gesturing toward the role of written constitu-
tionalism), these later and longer works nearly proselytized in favor of
a foundational written text for the polity. Just as the proprietors of
the Carolinas manufactured a vision of the economic and political life
that could be achieved by potential colonists willing to emigrate from
England, 15 Defoe provided a series of narratives that showed written
14 1 will use the term "myth" throughout this Article not to name a falsehood-as
surely it is true that we have a written constitution-but rather to designate an especially
compelling account of the genesis and reasons for a particular phenomenon.
15 One pamphlet intended to advertise the virtues of the Carolinas to potential set-
tlers contained a narrative that seemed almost to provide a roadmap for a Defoe novel; the
author of the pamphlet speculated about the fate of a younger son who might fall into
"unlawful ways . .. to maintain" himself were he to remain in England and fail to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the Carolinas. ROBERT HORNE, A BRIEF DESCRIP-
[Vol. 94:73
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quasi-constitutions in action. The rapid rise of the novel as a genre-
one that Ian Watt claimed Robinson Crusoe itself inauguratedl 6-and
the concomitant expansion in readership and literacy on both sides of
the Atlantic contributed to the power and reception of these mythic
visions.
17
In Part IV, the Article concludes by analyzing the relationships
among Defoe's account of the virtues of written constitutionalism,
Chief Justice Marshall's vision of its importance, and those aspects of
its significance identified by contemporary scholars. The recurrence
of several common threads confirms the existence of a family resem-
blance among the three moments of written constitutionalism, yet the
divergences between Defoe's and Chief Justice Marshall's accounts
demonstrates that, contrary to the latter's conclusions, nothing about
a written constitution inevitably entails judicial review.
I
DEFOE AS MYrH-MAKER, COGNATE, AND PRECEDENT
It was by a circuitous path that Defoe came to express his argu-
ments for written constitutional or quasi-constitutional texts in the
context of political tracts, the newly emerging genre of the realist
novel, and semi-fictionalized histories. Born around 1660, young
Daniel lived through both the plague that swept London in 1665 and
the Great Fire of the subsequent year before attending the Newington
Green Academy, run by religious dissenter Charles Morton, who
would later become president of Harvard College.'8 Defoe's parents
were members of a congregation led by Samuel Annesley, who had
become a nonconformist upon the passage (soon after Charles II's
TION OF THE PROVINCE OF CAROLINA (London, 1666), reprinted in ORIGINAL NARRATIVES OF
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY. NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA: 1650-1708, at 63, 72 U. Franklin
Jameson & Alexander S. Salley, Jr. eds., 1911). In Moll Flanders, Defoe analogously treats
the question of the different possibilities available to an individual without resources in
England and in the American colonies. See DANIEL DEFOE, MOLL FLANDERS 321-24 (Paul
Scanlon ed., Broadview Ed. 2005) (1722) (describing Moll's attempt late in life, after serv-
ing time as a deported felon in Virginia, to go to Carolina with her husband and recount-
ing how she eventually settled in Maryland).
16 For the claim that Robinson Crusoe was one of the first novels, see generally IAN
WAT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON, AND FIELDING 21-25, 60-92
(1957) (describing the characteristics of the novel that separate it from other written
forms, explaining how Defoe's work was the first to embody these characteristics, and dis-
cussing Robinson Crusoe, his first novel to do so). The question of what should be called the
first novel and whether that designation even makes sense is, of course, disputed and is
affected by critics' views about how the genre should be defined. See MICHAEL MCKEoN,
THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL 1600-1740, at xix (15th anniversary ed. 2002) (1987)
("I conceive [the novel's] emergence not as embodied within a single text or two, whether
Robinson Crusoe or Pamela or Shamela, but as an abstract field of narrative possibility shaped
by the dialectical engagement of its component 'parts.'").
17 See WATT, supra note 16, at 35-60.
18 BACKSCHEIDER, supra note 2, at 3-16.
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ascent to the throne) of the 1662 Act of Uniformity, which required
oaths and adherence to the tenets of the Church of England.' 9 Al-
though Defoe ultimately abandoned pursuit of the ministry and left
religious training, 20 his early exposure to and investment in religious
affairs traced a long trajectory in his later writings.
Despite marrying and entering upon the career of a merchant,
21
Defoe obtained neither steady prosperity nor a stable existence. Well
before writing any of his novels, Defoe had participated in a rebellion
against James II; been pilloried for publication of a satirical pamphlet
adopting the false persona of a Church of England man; unsuccess-
fully attempted to take advantage of new bankruptcy legislation; and
served as a secret agent in Scotland for Queen Anne's Secretary of
State, Robert Harley.22 Throughout, religion and the liberty of the
dissenters remained two of his central concerns. At the same time,
however, the precise contours of his theories developed and trans-
mogrified, in part evolving and in part addressing issues from a variety
of disparate angles. As Paula Backscheider writes, "In later years De-
foe's tracts would be written from the points of view of an Anglican, a
Dissenter, a Quaker, a Scot, a leader of the mob, a Whig, a Jacobite,
and others."23 Given this multiplicity of voices, combined with the
anonymous publication of many of Defoe's writings, care should be
taken in attributing particular views to Defoe himself as an author.
This Article therefore brackets the issues of authorship surrounding
some of Defoe's work in order to reconstruct the arguments for writ-
ten constitutionalism that these texts might cumulatively be seen to
provide, and which the elimination of one or two texts from the ac-
cepted canon of Defoe's writings would not affect.
24
19 Id. at 7.
20 Id. at 28-30.
21 Id. at 30-34.
22 Id. at 35-40 (detailing Defoe's participation in the Monmouth Rebellion); id. at
94-125 (describing Defoe's 1702 pamphlet The Shortest-Way with the Dissenters and the im-
prisonment and pillorying that resulted from it); id. at 201-02 (analyzing Defoe's failed
efforts to discharge his debts under the 1705 Act for Preventing Frauds Committed by
Bankrupts); id. at 159-60, 203-25 (explaining Defoe's evolving role as Robert Harley's
emissary in Scotland).
23 Id. at 143-44.
24 The difficulty in identifying Defoe definitively as the author of some of the works
within the canon emanates partly from the fact that many of his tracts and novels-even
those that scholars unanimously consider to be his, such as Robinson Crusoe itself-were
published anonymously or pseudonymously. For instance, the title page of the first edition
of Robinson Crusoe reads "Written by Himself," referring to Crusoe, not Defoe. THE LIFE
AND STRANGE SURPRIZING ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON CRUSOE (Michael Shinagel ed., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1994) (1719) [hereinafter DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE]. This practice was not
especially unusual in the early eighteenth century and remained familiar at the time of the
American Founding. For questions about the authorship of particular texts, see infra notes
47, 195, 197.
[Vol. 94:73
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Regardless of whether Defoe deserves credit for all of the works
in the extensive canon, few writers in history have found themselves
better situated to develop the mythic imagination of many genera-
tions across several continents than he. Whether the first novelist or
only one of the first,2 5 Defoe was situated at the commencement of an
explosion of fiction, an explosion that corresponded with, and helped
to construct, an increase in literacy and an expansion of the reading
class. 26 His work was also received not only in England, but also, as a
parodic pamphlet explained in 1720, just a year after the publication
of Robinson Crusoe, spread "even as far as the East and West-Indies."
27
The popularity of Defoe's writings-and, in particular, of Robin-
son Crusoe and its sequels-was especially striking in America. Robin-
son Crusoe was one of the first novels printed in America, and, through
the flourishing trans-Atlantic book trade, copies of its many English
editions were imported as well. 28 Early American authors were them-
selves influenced by the work. Charles Brockden Brown, one of the
first American novelists, explained that, upon returning to Robinson
Crusoe as an adult, he "no longer [saw] in it, the petty adventures of a
shipwrecked man, the recreations of a boyish fancy; but ... a picture
25 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26 See PATRICK BRANTLINGER, THE READING LESSON: THE THREAT OF MASS LITERACY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH FICTION 1 (1998) (observing, following John Tinnon Taylor,
that "between about 1750 and the 1830s many people objected to novel-reading as an
abuse of literacy likely to do moral damage to the readers and, indeed, to the national
culture").
27 See NOVAK, supra note 2, at 565 (quoting THE BATYLE OF THE AUTHORS LATELY
FOUGHT IN COVENT-GARDEN, BETWEEN SIR JOHN EDGAR, GENERALISIMO ON ONE SIDE, AND
HORATIUS TRUEWIT, ON THE OTHER (London, 1720)).
28 As Jay Fliegelman observed, Robinson Crusoe, printed in America in 1774, became
one of "[tihe three 'bestsellers' of 1775." JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS & PILGRIMS: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800, at 39 (1982). Al-
though an abridged American edition printed by Hugh Gaine was widely distributed, the
full version "was popular under an English imprint in its own right throughout the Revolu-
tionary period." Id. at 69.
For the complicated history of the American editions of Robinson Crusoe, see generally
Leanne B. Smith, Robinson Crusoe in America (May 1983) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Yale University) (on file with author); CLARENCE S. BRIGHAM, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERI-
CAN EDITIONS OF ROBINSON CRUSOE TO 1830 (1958). For discussion of the dynamics of
book importation, see generally 1 A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL
BOOK IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD (Hugh Amory & David D. Hall eds., 1999). See also E. JEN-
NIFER MONAGHAN, LEARNING TO READ AND WRITE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 302 (2005) ("Even
as the volume of American book production rose, so did that of importation, which out-
stripped domestic production for the entire [eighteenth] century."). One early example
of the sale of an unnamed edition of Defoe's oeuvre is provided by a notice in the South
Carolina Gazette from March 24, 1733: "To be Sold by the Printer hereof... Bishop Tillot-
son's Works, Burchet's Naval History, Ogilby's America .... De Foe's Works .... Moliere's
Plays, A Dutch Grammar, Plays &c." HENNIG COHEN, THE SOUTH CAROLINA GAZETfTE,
1732-1775, at 127 (1953).
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of the events by which.., desert regions are colonized, and the foun-
dations laid of new and civilized communities.
'" 29
Although Robinson Crusoe did not represent simply "the recrea-
tions of a boyish fancy," its popularity as a children's book and adapta-
tion into this form only served to enhance its influence. The rise of
the novel itself can, according to Jay Fliegelman, be traced in part to
the "new social emphasis on the moral and cultural significance of
education; for it was only as a form of pedagogy that much of eight-
eenth-century fiction was considered acceptable and useful . . .,,o
Robinson Crusoe, in particular, while employed for pedagogical pur-
poses, foregrounded the theme of the transition from childhood to
maturity in a manner that suggested the potential for political ac-
tion.31 When Jean-Jacques Rousseau advocated that Robinson Crusoe
be deployed for educational purposes in Emile,3 2 he was not simply
domesticating Defoe; rather, he was suggesting the most effective way
of constructing a new type of individual and a new type of citizen.
In America, the advent and rise of secular children's books both
enhanced literacy and assisted in training a different kind of reader.
33
Cathy Davidson has argued that this trend coincided with "a new rela-
tionship of audience to authority . . . and different possibilities for
political action and social change [,] ... [as well as] an increased sense
of autonomy and an education not necessarily grounded in theocracy
but in democracy. '34 Just as America began to speak of "we the peo-
ple" in the political sphere, the form and reception of literary materi-
als suggested an extension of this "people" beyond the ranks of the
elite. The emerging cultural significance of the very medium of print,
as Michael Warner has shown, assisted in the development of a partic-
ular conception and self-conception of the public, one that even car-
ried implications for understanding the Constitution itself.
35
29 Charles Brockden Brown, Robinson Crusoe, LITERARY MAG. (n.p., 1804), reprinted in
THE ENGLISH LITERATURES OF AMERICA, 1500-1800, at 697, 698 (Myra Jehlen & Michael
Warner eds., 1996).
30 FLIEGELMAN, supra note 28, at 36.
31 See id. at 67-83.
32 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
33 See MONAGHAN, supra note 28, at 302-32.
34 CATHY N. DAVIDSON, REVOLUTION AND THE WORD: THE RISE OF THE NOVEL IN
AMERICA 141 (expanded ed. 2004).
35 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, at xi (1990) ("The politics of printed texts in
republican American lay as much in the cultural meaning of their printedness as in their
objectified nature or the content of their arguments. The force of the technology and the
act of reading performed by the individual citizen were redetermined in the course of this
social transformation."); id. at 110 ("The printedness of the constitution, in short, was un-
derstood as precluding any official hermeneutics, especially an intentionalist one that
would accord privilege to the views of the delegates.").
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To the extent that Defoe did construct a myth of written constitu-
tionalism, that myth may have acquired purchase not simply by reach-
ing individual Founders,3 6 but rather through its broader cultural
dissemination. Significant members of the Founding Generation did,
indeed, refer to Defoe's work-including his non-fiction-which they
might have read in American editions, or in those imported and ei-
ther included in the circulating libraries or on offer from the book-
sellers of the time.3 7 Thus Benjamin Franklin, who was exposed as a
child to Defoe's Essay on Projects, claimed that it had given him "a Turn
of Thinking that had an Influence on some of the principal future
Events of [his] Life. s3 8 John Adams was also familiar with Defoe's writ-
ings: his library included not only a French edition of Robinson Crusoe,
intended for John Quincy Adams' consumption as a youth, but also
several other texts by Defoe.
39
36 Robert Ferguson's seminal Law and Letters in American Culture illuminates the inter-
twining of legal and literary figures and pursuits in late-eighteenth-century America. Al-
though the literary interests of figures such as John Adams did probably help to render
English writers like Defoe relevant in the public sphere, Ferguson focuses more on connec-
tions between American practitioners of law and literature. See generally ROBERT A. FERGU-
SON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
37 The 1765 catalogue of books from the Library Company of Philadelphia includes
an entry for "Defoe's Works, consisting of his true Born Englishman &c. 2 vol. Octavo." A
CATALOGUE OF BOOKS, BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION LIBRARY COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA
30 (Philadelphia, William Bradford 1765). Likewise, according to its 1793 catalogue, the
Rhode Island College Library possessed Defoe'sJure Divino. CATALOGUE OF BOOKS BELONG-
ING TO THE LIBRARY OF RHODE ISLAND COLLEGE (Providence, J. Carter 1793). A bookseller
in New York and Philadelphia boasted copies of Defoe's Plan of the English Trade and Com-
merce. A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS, SOLD BY RIVINGTON AND BROWN, BOOKSELLERS AND STATION-
ERS FROM LONDON, AT THEIR STORES, OVER AGAINST THE GOLDEN KEY, IN HANOVER-SQUARE,
NEW YORK, AND OVER AGAINST THE LONDON COFFEE-HOusE, IN PHILADELPHIA 65 (n.p.,
1762). Likewise, Ben Franklin sold a copy of Defoe's Family Instructor. A CATALOGUE OF
CHOICE AND VALUABLE BOOKS, CONSISTING OF NEAR 600 VOLUMES, IN MOST FACULTIES AND
SCIENCES 12 (Philadelphia, 1744).
Examples of American editions of Defoe's other works include selections from his
Journal of the Plague Year, Moll Flanders, and The Family Instructor. See THE DREADFUL VISITA-
TION, IN A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTS OF THE PLAGUE (Philadelphia,
Joseph Cruikshank 1774); THE LIFE, DEATH & MISFORTUNES OF THE FAMOUS MOLL FLAN-
DERS (Boston, William M'Alpine 1773); DANIEL DEFOE, THE FAMILY-INSTRUCTOR (Philadel-
phia, 1795).
An edition of Thomas DeLaune's A Plea for the Nonconformists published in Saratoga
County in 1800 suggests the continuing influence of Defoe's religious writings as well. De-
foe's preface, which addresses issues of religious dissent and toleration, was republished in
this volume as the work of "the Author of the Review." THOMAS DE LAUNE, A PLEA FOR THE
NON-CONFORMISTS, at xxiii-xxxix (1800).
38 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 58 (Leonard W.
Larabee et al. eds., 2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1771).
39 David McCullough observes Adams' cognizance of Defoe's work several times in his
biography. In a letter to her husband, Abigail Adams quoted Defoe's Kentish Petition, using
the phrase "all men would be tyrants if they could." DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 104
(2001). Adams himself cited Defoe's satirical pamphlet The Shortest-Way with the Dissenters in
a 1786 letter to John Jay. Letter from John Adams to John Jay, in 8 JOHN ADAMS, THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 391 (Boston, Little,
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While Defoe's model may have provided a precedent for the ex-
perience of written constitutionalism in America through the vehicle
of the Founding generation, I would contend that it is even more in-
structive to consider Defoe as the first recorder of a particular myth,
that of the genesis and virtues of written constitutionalism. Whether
causally connected with the American constitutional experiment or
not, the myth that emerges from Defoe's works is one that presents a
particularly compelling vision of why a polity might resort to a written
constitution. Defoe's myth, while bearing certain resemblances to the
one we possess today, also retains its own peculiarities. Examining De-
foe's myth both illuminates how something like our contemporary
conception would have developed and why the version to which we
adhere now is not inevitable in all its configurations. To the extent
that we are still captured by notions that resemble Defoe's, it is helpful
to examine their genealogy; to the extent that we are not, it is useful
to explore why we have come to associate disparate values with written
constitutionalism.
Even leaving aside any causal connections, it is not entirely coinci-
dental that both Defoe and the members of the American Founding
generation developed convictions about the advantages of a written
constitution. The experience at both historical moments of a turn
away from monarchical and toward legislative power raised the com-
pelling question of how this latter form of authority could be re-
strained. The early-eighteenth-century England of Defoe thereby
furnished a cognate to the late-eighteenth-century American context
of the Founders. In both instances, the written constitution provided
a powerful ally against legislative overreaching-but the question
might still remain as to whether it furnished a necessary, inevitable, or
even sufficient one. Indeed, it might be possible to imagine an alter-
native history for America, one in which the principles of judicial re-
view based upon common or natural law would have continued to
develop after the Revolution without the intervention of any written
constitution at all.
Brown & Co. 1850) ("Like Daniel Defoe's game cock among the horses feet ...."); see also
DANIEL DEFOE, THE SHORTEST-WAY WITH THE DISSENTERS (London, 1702). More generally,
as McCullough observes, "Mason, Wilson, andJohn Adams, no less than Jefferson, were...
drawing on long familiarity with the seminal works of the English and Scottish writers John
Locke, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and Henry St. John Bolingbroke, or such English
poets as Defoe .... " Id. at 121.
Adams' library contained: The History of the Union Between England and Scotland, with an
Appendix of Original Papers, to which Is Now Added a Life of the Celebrated Author, and a Copious
Index (1786); Histoire des Principales Dgcouvertes Faites dans les Arts et les Sciences: Sur-tout dans
les Branches Importantes du Commerce ... , Traduit de L'anglois (1767); and a 1775 French
adaptation of Robinson Crusoe by Feutry, which was inscribed "The Imitator to Mr. Adams
for the benefit of his son John Quincy Adams."
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II
FROM THE PROMISE TO THE TEXT
Defoe's vision of a written constraint on legislation emerged only
gradually, as the culmination of various efforts to discern a source for
the limitation of legislative-as opposed to monarchical-authority.
The exact nature of Defoe's politics has been hotly contested: while
earlier commentators identified him seamlessly with the liberalism of
John Locke (and read his work in conjunction with Locke's articula-
tion of the social contract in the latter's Two Treatises of Government),
revisionists have made a persuasive case for Defoe's allegiance to mo-
narchical sovereignty.40 The difficulty in situating Defoe politically
derives from his complex relation to the historical moment of the
early eighteenth century, a time at which parliamentary supremacy
was being consolidated in England. The Glorious Revolution of 1688,
through which William and Mary were invited to assume the crown of
England, had led to a revolutionary settlement that cemented the sov-
ereignty of Parliament, although this circumstance was not immedi-
ately evident to all.4 1 The effect of the emerging transformation did
not appear to observers as uniformly benign. Indeed, Defoe's appeals
both to the sovereign and to a constitution or charter represented
attempts to locate some type of constraint on Parliament's legislative
power.
Defoe's first forays in this direction, which Philip Hamburger has
insightfully analyzed, suggested that when Parliament exceeded its au-
thority, power returned to the "people themselves," 42 a theory that
could well justify revolution. 4 3 It was in 1701-02, through the case of
the Kentish prisoners and his pamphlet The Original Power of the Collec-
tive Body of the People of England, that Defoe most explicitly appealed to
this residual power of the people, who kept their natural rights de-
spite delegating powers to Parliament through the social contract.
44
40 MANUEL SCHONHORN, DEFOE'S POLITICS: PARLIAMENT, POWER, KINGSHIP AND "ROBIN-
SON CRUSOE" (1st paperback ed. 2006).
41 GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1688-1689, at 133-34
(1965) ("Apart from the dynastic change, which coloured everything in the new era, there
were only two new principles of any importance introduced in 1689. One was that the
Crown could not remove Judges; the other was that Protestant Dissenters were to enjoy
toleration for their religious worship. Almost everything else was, nominally at least, only
restoration, to repair the breaches in the constitutional fabric made by the illegalities of
James II. But in fact the struggle between King and Parliament had been for ever
decided.").
42 Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in
City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2106 (1994) (quoting DANIEL DEFOE,
THE ORIGINAL POWER OF THE COLLECTIVE BODY OF THE PEOPLE 14 (1702)).
43 See id. at 2097-114.
44 See id. at 2105-07.
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This recourse to the people did not, however, exactly indicate a
democratic element in Defoe's work, but instead suggested the begin-
nings of an effort to limit legislative power. This Part focuses on the
years following 1702 and Defoe's transition during this period from a
more archaic vision of the sovereign's promise as constraining Parlia-
ment in the English context, to a seemingly prescient contractarian
and proto-constitutional understanding of limits on legislative author-
ity in the colonial context of the Carolinas. Although on first inspec-
tion this transformation appears radical and rapid, certain
commonalities emerge between Defoe's views; for instance, Defoe's
efforts at both moments shared the aim of discerning a power that
would check the legislative branch. Further, the contractarian model,
rather than simply replacing the promise, incorporated some of its
elements, including reliance on the sacrosanct quality of the oath.
Defoe's constitutionalism thus remained continuous with certain as-
pects of monarchical theory.
The shift in Defoe's justifications emerges out of a comparison
between his 1704 pamphlet, A Serious Inquiry Into this Grand Question4 5
and two works addressing the situation of religious dissenters in the
Carolinas, his 1705 tract Party-Tyranny46 and his 1706 argument in The
Case of Protestant Dissenters.47 These interventions, composed within a
brief interval, provide insight into one possible trajectory for the his-
torical development of a notion of written constitutionalism.
A. A Serious Inquiry
In A Serious Inquiry, Defoe first contends that the 1689 Act of Tol-
eration, which granted a number of privileges to protestant dissenters
as part of the revolutionary settlement,48 restrained Parliament from
45 DANIEL DEFOE, A SERIOUS INQUIRY INTO THIS GRAND QUESTION: WHETHER A LAW TO
PREVENT THE OCCASIONAL CONFORMITY OF DISSENTERS, WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE ACT OF TOLERATION, AND A BREACH OF THE QUEEN'S PROMISE (London, 1704) [herein-
after DEFOE, A SERIOUS INQUIRY].
46 DANIEL DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, OR, AN OCCASIONAL BILL IN MINIATURE; As NOW
PRACTISED IN CAROLINA, HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF BOTH HOUSES OF PAR-
LIAMENT (London, 1705), reprinted in NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, supta note 15, at 220
[hereinafter DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY].
47 DANIEL DEFOE, THE CASE OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS IN CAROLINA, SHEWING HOW A
LAW TO PREVENT OCCASIONAL CONFORMITY THERE, HAS ENDED IN THE TOTAL SUBVERSION OF
THE CONSTITUTION IN CHURCH AND STATE (London, 1706) [hereinafter DEFOE, THE CASE
OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS]. This work was published anonymously, but has been attrib-
uted to Defoe by many, although not all, critics. See, e.g., HENRY CLINTON HUTCHINS,
DANIEL DEFOE, 1660-1731: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1936) (attributing the work to Defoe); JOHN
ROBERT MOORE, A CHECKLIST OF THE WRITINGS OF DANIEL DEFOE 45-46 (2d ed., Archon
Books 1971) (same); NOVAK, supra note 2, at 276-78 (same); see also, e.g., P.N. FURBANK &
W.R. OWENS, DEFOE DE-ATrRIBUTIONS: A CRITIQUE OF J.R. MOORE'S CHECKLIST 23-24
(1994) (criticizing those who attribute the work to Defoe).
48 The Toleration Act, 1689: An Act for Exempting Their Majesties' Protestant Sub-
jects Dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties of Certain Laws, I Gul. &
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passing inconsistent legislation. Thus, Parliament's attempt to pro-
hibit what was known as "occasional conformity"-dissenters' con-
formity with the Church of England to the extent that would enable
them to hold public office-violated the principles articulated by that
Act.49 Acknowledging, however, that the House was entitled to inter-
pret its own prior acts and, presumably, overrule them, Defoe then
turns to the argument he finds more compelling, that which is based
upon the Queen's promise.
At the end of her first session of Parliament, Queen Anne had
confirmed a commitment to the Act of Toleration in language that
suggested a desire to attain civil peace by preventing religious strife:
I shall always wish that no differences of Opinion among those that
are equally affected to my Service may be the Occasion of Heats and
Animosities among themselves. I shall be very careful to preserve
and maintain the Act of Toleration, and to set the minds of all my
People at quiet.
50
In A Serious Inquiry and also in his letters to his sometimes patron,
Secretary of State Robert Harley, Defoe insists on the importance of
the word of the Queen-a public declaration that could, if well
phrased, assuage dissenters' concerns or, if inadvisably stated, occa-
sion unrest.
51
As Defoe explains in A Serious Inquiry, "All the Dissenters depen-
dance therefore, and all their Moral Security is plac'd, not in the Act
Mary cap., 18, reprinted in 1 PROTESTANT NONCONFORMIST TEXTS 1550 TO 1700, at 397 (R.
Tudur Jones et al. eds., Ashgate Pub. 2007).
49 Defoe composed his 1704 pamphlet in response to the introduction of a proposal
in Parliament to prohibit occasional conformity that had already been debated in 1702.
Although Parliament did not pass such a law in 1704, it ultimately did so in 1711. See An
Act for Preserving the Protestant Religion, 1711, 10 Ann., c. 6 (Gr. Brit.).
Defoe's personal stance on occasional conformity was complex. He had deplored the
activity as a religious matter in a 1698 pamphlet called An Enquiry Into the Occasional Con-
formity of Dissenters, in Cases of Preferments, but he nevertheless fought against legislation
prohibiting it. See BACKSCHEIDER, supra note 2, at 84, 94.
50 3 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FROM THE RESTORA-
TION TO THE PRESENT TIME 203 (London, Chandler 1742) [hereinafter HISTORY AND
PROCEEDINGS].
51 In one letter to Harley, Defoe claimed that the dissenters' resistance to Queen
Anne's government arose out of another sentence of her address at the dissolution of the
first Parliament of her reign, the statement that "My own principles must always keep me
entirely firm to the interests and religion of the Church of England, and will incline me to
countenance those who have the truest zeal to support it." Letter from Daniel Defoe to
Robert Harley (Letter 14), July-August 1704(?), in THE LETrERS OF DANIEL DEFOE 51 n.1
(George Harris Healey ed., 1955); see also 3 HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at
203. Defoe also claimed, however, that the rift could be healed by "[t]wo words at the
Opening the Next session" or "[s]hould her Majtie Declare That as she had Often given
her word to Maintain the Tolleration, So She should Never Consent to any Act that Seem'd
to Restrain The present Liberty of the Dissenters." Letter from Daniel Defoe to Robert
Harley (Letter 15), August-September 1704(?), inTHE LETTERS OF DANIEL DEFOE, supra, at
53, 55.
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of Toleration, for that may be Mortal, but in Her Majesty's Sacred
Promise. ' 52 Also, according to Defoe,
The Royal Veracity of the Queen, more than once Repeated on this
Head, is a Satisfaction to the Dissenters, that they shall Enjoy the
full Benefit of the Act of Toleration ... and it seems to me, that the
Safety of the Dissenters has a greater Dependance upon this Head,
than upon the Act of Toleration it self.
5 "
Not only would Queen Anne fail to assent to any attempt to under-
mine the toleration, but even the act of proposing such a bill in Parlia-
ment would be "to desire the Queen to break her Word[.]" 54 Such an
act of breaking her word would thrust the Queen into "dishonor," a
reputationally based account of constraints on sovereignty that had
been prominently espoused by sixteenth-century French political the-
oristJean Bodin, among others.
Bodin's Six Livres de la Republique was widely received in seven-
teenth-century England, including by no less a figure than King James
I, who propounded a divine-right theory of monarchy and was later
believed to have launched England in the direction of its mid-seven-
teenth-century Revolution. 55 According to Bodin, the sovereign is not
bound by the law, but can be limited by his own promise.56 Bodin
distinguishes between laws made by a prince or his predecessors and
those that he has himself promised to keep; whereas the prince will
always be able to disregard the former, he may not be so entitled with
respect to the latter.57 Whether a prince is bound by his own promises
seems, for Bodin, to depend on contract theory. The sovereign is not
obligated to keep his word if he swore only to himself, but, "if a sover-
eign prince promises another prince to keep laws that he or his prede-
cessors have made, he is obligated to keep them if the prince to whom
he gave his word has an interest in his so doing-and even if he did
not take an oath"; the same holds of a promise that the prince gives to
his subjects. 58 Monetary consideration is not required to render the
contract valid, and the honor and dignity of the prince should keep
him faithful to his promise: "For the word of the prince should be like
an oracle, and his dignity suffers when one has so low an opinion of
52 DEFOE, A SERIOUS INQUIRY, supra note 45, at 28.
53 Id. at 13-14.
54 Id. at 14.
55 See generally Bernadette Meyler, Theaters of Pardoning: Tragicomedy and the Gunpowder
Plot, 25 STUD. L., POL. & Soc'Y 37 (2002).
56 JEAN BODIN, ON SovERiGN-ry 11-15 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1992) (1576).
57 Id. at 13.
58 Id.; see also id. at 15 ("Law depends on him who has the sovereignty and he can
obligate all his subjects .. .but cannot obligate himself [by laws]. A contract between a
prince and his subjects is mutual; it obligates the two parties reciprocally and one party
cannot contravene it to the prejudice of the other and without the other's consent.").
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him that he is not believed unless he swears, or is not (expected to be)
faithful to his promises unless one gives him money."59 Hence,
whereas laws only bind subjects, not the sovereign, the sovereign's
promises, when rendered to another individual, whether prince or
subject, retain force over him as well. 60
Defoe adopts a similar logic in A Serious Inquiry, emphasizing the
harm to the Queen's reputation that would ensue from failing to ful-
fill her promise to maintain the Act of Toleration. Rather than a
mere interpretation of the Act, the current legislation constitutes a
partial repeal; for Defoe, "to Limit the Extent of the Toleration, is to
Repeal part of the Law; and consequently to Intrench upon her Majes-
ties Promise. '6 1 In consenting to it, the Queen would therefore "In-
jur [e] her own Honour" and would "lessen[ ] the Opinion the World
has entertained of her Royal Word, and the Honesty of her Maintain-
ing it." ' 62 Because the Queen's majesty consists, in part, of her honor
and dignity, approving of parliamentary legislation that contradicted
her prior promise would undermine her sovereign authority.
Defoe's argument implicates not only the Queen's honor con-
ceived in isolation, but also the respective capacities of Parliament and
Queen, a consideration of the separation of powers that was assuming
increased salience as authority came to be consolidated in Parliament
rather than the Crown. Some supporters of the law to prevent occa-
sional conformity had contended that an act of Parliament should be
distinguished from a positive expression of the Queen's will; accord-
ing to this stance,
[H]er Majesty will not fail to be as good as her Word, as far as Con-
cerns her self, but that if it be done by an Act of Parliament, that is a
general thing, is the Act and Deed of the People of England, that 'tis
their own doing, not hers; even the Dissenters themselves do it, for
they are properly said to Act in their Representatives.
63
Defoe's reply to this self-excusing defense of Parliament is two-fold:
first, that "It] he Queen's Promise is not Negative, that she will not take
away the Toleration, but it is positive, that she will preserve it, and Pro-
tect the Dissenters in the Enjoyment of their Liberty"; and second,
that the mode of the dissenters' representation in Parliament does not
eliminate the possibility of a law being passed against their will.64 It is,
in other words, the Queen's responsibility to protect the liberty of
59 Id. at 14.
60 The sovereign can, however, be relieved under certain circumstances of the obliga-
tion he has incurred, just as subjects can be relieved of the obligations entailed by unrea-
sonable or unjust contracts. Id.
61 DEFOE, A SERIOUS INQUIRY, supra note 45, at 15.
62 Id. at 14, 19.
63 Id. at 15-16.
64 Id. at 16.
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those individuals or minority groups who cannot command a majority
in Parliament.
Rather than insisting upon judicial enforcement of the Queen's
promise, Defoe instead suggests that the dissenters resort to a plea to
the Queen, one that would remind her of her promise and suggest
their reliance upon it.65 Defoe's description of why the dissenters
would be justified in so relying suggests that the promise has itself
assumed a quasi-contractual status:
Nor can the Dissenters be blam'd for taking her Majesty at her
Word; the Queen had certainly never made such a promise to us,
but that she Intended these two things.
1. Punctually to perform it
2. She Intended the Dissenters should believe, and depend
upon it.
The Dissenters can never Acquit her Majesty of this Promise;
'tis a Solemn Engagement to them, and injustice to their Posterity,
they can never quit their Claim to the Performance of it.
66
The dissenters' reliance upon the promise has rendered it quasi-con-
tractual, and Defoe further indicates that the dissenters represent not
only their own but also their successors' interests, which they cannot
abrogate by themselves.
In A Serious Inquiry, Defoe thus interprets the Queen's promise as
a source of continuing obligation that Parliament should not view as
subject to revision, and upon which the dissenters are entitled to rely.
In responding to arguments about the dissenters' ability to represent
their own religious interests in Parliament, Defoe also foreshadows
certain elements of American constitutionalism, including the im-
pulse to protect minority interests against the activities of a majority
and to view current interest-holders as maintaining rights for a future
populace. A Serious Inquiry thereby presents the Queen and her prom-
ise as a foil to increasing parliamentary supremacy and demonstrates
that, although the Queen's promise may not be judicially enforceable,
it does serve to establish a moral right that can form the basis for the
dissenters' petition.
B. Party-Tyranny
In two later pamphlets that address the plight of religious dissent-
ers in the Carolinas, Defoe resorts less to Bodin's theories of sover-
eignty than to his own version of social contract theory in asserting a
contract-based limitation upon the acts of a legislature. 67 By grant of
65 Id. at 20.
66 Id. at 21.
67 For substantial discussions of Defoe's involvement in this controversy, see 3 JAMES
LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA: CHURCH AND STATE, MORAL-
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a Charter to the Lords Proprietor in 1663, King Charles II had estab-
lished the colony of Carolina; the Charter contained some specifica-
tions about the colony's form of government, as well as an allowance
of a certain extent of religious liberty within the discretion of the Pro-
prietors. 68 The Proprietors had later approved a series of Fundamen-
tal Constitutions that included significantly more concrete protections
for religious liberty than the Charter itself.69
Far from becoming forgotten relics, these documents (and the
liberties they held out for the colonists) were vigorously promoted by
the Proprietors and their agents in advertising designed to encourage
English men and women to uproot themselves and move to the Caro-
linas. A pamphlet from 1666 addressed younger brothers and others
who, in the normal course of affairs, might find themselves without
sufficient means were they to remain in England.70 Although it began
by extolling the natural virtues of the colony's climate, it then enu-
merated "the chief of the Privileges" 7' granted to "such as shall trans-
port themselves and Servants in convenient time. '72 Not surprisingly,
the first such privilege to be enumerated was one of religious free-
dom; as the tract stated, "There is full and free Liberty of Conscience
granted to all, so that no man is to be molested or called in question
for matters of Religious Concern; but every one to be obedient to the
Civil Government, worshipping God after their own way."73 In a sub-
sequent document from 1682, Samuel Wilson, who had served as sec-
retary to one of the Lords Proprietor, the Earl of Craven, provided An
Account of the Province of Carolina explicitly aimed at promoting the vir-
tues of the colony, yet claiming to be bound by "the Rules of Truth."
74
Wilson here emphasized that "no Money can be raised or Law made,
without the consent of the Inhabitants or their Representatives" and
that the "Lords Proprietors have there setled a Constitution of Gov-
ITY AND FREE EXPRESSION 30-35 (1992); James Lowell Underwood, The Dawn of Religious
Freedom in South Carolina: The Journey from Limited Tolerance to Constitutional Right, in THE
DAWN OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN SOUTH CAROLINA I Uames Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis
Burke eds., 2006).
68 UNDERWOOD, supra note 67, at 3-18.
69 Id. The Fundamental Constitutions, which were never approved generally by the
people (although everyone who joined the assembly or received land was obliged to swear
to uphold them), were of contested applicability during the late seventeenth century. See
ROBERT M. WEIR, COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY 48-73 (1st paperback ed., Univ.
of South Carolina Press 1997) (1983).
70 See HORNE, supra note 15, at 72.
71 Id. at 71.
72 Id. at 66.
73 Id. at 71.
74 SAMUEL WILSON, AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROVINCE OF CAROLINA (London, 1682), re-
printed in NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 164. Later in the document,
Wilson seems a little less certain of the veracity of his own words. As he writes towards the
end, "I think I have written nothing but truth, sure I am I have inserted no wilful false-
hood." Id. at 174.
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ernment, whereby is granted Liberty of Conscience, and wherein all
possible care is taken for the equal Administration of Justice.
75
These and other promotional materials put forth by the Proprietors
or their associates thus placed significant weight upon the religious
liberty established by the Charter and the Fundamental Constitutions
of Carolina.
76
Perhaps in part because of these promotional efforts, the Caroli-
nas came to be populated by colonists of varying religious affilia-
tions. 77 The Reverend John Blair, who spent a brief stint in the
Carolinas as an Anglican missionary during 1704, divided the religious
adherents there into four categories. 78 Blair's taxonomy, presented
from the vantage point of the established church, included the
following:
[F]irst, the Quakers, who are the most powerful enemies to Church
government, but a people very ignorant of what they profess. The
second sort are a great many who have no religion, but would be
Quakers, if by that they were not obliged to lead a more moral life
than they are willing to comply to. A third sort are something like
Presbyterians, which sort is upheld by some idle fellows who have
left their lawful employment, and preach and baptize through the
country, without any manner of orders from any sect or pretended
Church. A fourth sort, who are really zealous for the interest of the
Church, are the fewest in number, but the better sort of people, and
75 Id. at 166.
76 Similar pamphlets continued to appear into the 1700s and persisted in emphasiz-
ing the benefits of the religious toleration to be enjoyed in the colony. See THOMAS NAIRNE
& JOHN NORRIS, SELLING A NEW WORLD: Two COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA PROMOTIONAL
PAMPHLETS 20 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1989) ("[W]hat [pamphleteers] Nairne and Norris...
emphasized were the provisions that people of all Protestant religious persuasions were to
'have free Toleration to exercise and enjoy the same without Interruption' and that 'All
foreign Protestants, of what Denomination soever,' were to be 'made Denizens within
three Months after their Arrival."').
77 Robert Weir thusly explains the late-seventeenth-century migrations and their
impetus:
Beginning about 1680 [the proprietors] launched a recruiting drive aimed
especially at Huguenots and English dissenters, and their efforts met with
considerable success. Augmented by refugees who left France after 1685,
when Louis XIV revoked the protection hitherto afforded by the Edict of
Nantes, the influx of Huguenots brought nearly 500 individuals to South
Carolina by the end of the century. And before the pressure on dissenters
in England relaxed during the latter half of the decade, perhaps an equal
number of English Presbyterians and Baptists arrived, led by members of
several prominent families.
WEIR, supra note 69, at 64.
78 Reverend John Blair, Reverend John Blair's Mission to North Carolina (1704), in NARRA-
TIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 214. This document was written, in part, to
justify Blair's own failure in the Carolinas to his supporters, the Society for the Propagation
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts-a failure that may have distorted Blair's description of the
colony. Id. at 214, 218.
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would do very much for the settlement of the Church government
there, if not opposed by these three precedent sects .... 79
The first three of these groups would have been clumped within the
capacious category of "dissenters." For his own part, Defoe's religious
beliefs do not emerge with pellucid clarity from his writings and have
been the subject of some dispute, but would presumably have corre-
sponded, at least in part, with those of some of the Carolina
dissenters.8 0
Despite the foundational documents that appeared to protect the
religious liberty of the inhabitants of the Carolinas, the colonial legis-
lature had, in 1704, passed an act prohibiting dissenters from sitting
in the assembly.8' In part, local disputes had led to enactment of the
law. For some years, the Carolinas had been controlled by dissenting
governors.82 When one of these governors, Joseph Blake, died in
1700, the candidate chosen to replace him, Landgrave Joseph Mor-
ton, was also a dissenter.8 3 Because Morton had accepted a royal com-
mission as an admiralty judge while holding a commission from the
Proprietors, some contended that he should be disqualified from be-
coming governor; 4 to the dismay of the dissenters, this argument was
accepted and James Moore, a member of the established church, be-
came governor instead. 5 Moore soon began to pursue an effort to
invade Florida and, in doing so, contracted significant debts.8 6 When
Governor Moore tried to raise funds from the legislature in 1703, the
religious dissenters opposed this plan, and summarily withdrew from
the Commons House of Assembly when it allocated money for his
campaign.8 7 Their departure undermined the quorum necessary for
passing legislation; although they offered to return the next day, their
overture was rejected and their acts instead occasioned considerable
unrest, resulting in physical attacks upon them.8 As might be antici-
pated, the dissenters protested this treatment to the Governor, among
79 Id. at 216. Apparently, many French Protestants had also settled in the colony, as
well as some Jews. See DEFOE, A SERIOUS INQUIRY, supra note 45, at 245-46.
80 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
81 See An Act for the More Effectual Preservation of the Government of This Province
(1704), reprinted in 2 THOMAS COOPER, THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; ED-
ITED, UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATURE 232-35 (1837) [hereinafter STATUTES AT
LARGE]; see also An Act for the More Effectual Preservation of the Government, quoted in
DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 253-54.
82 See NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 267.
83 See id.; John Ash, The Present State of Affairs in Carolina (n.p., 1706), in NARRATIVES OF
EARLY CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 269.
84 Ash, supra note 83, at 269; see also DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 237.
85 Ash, supra note 83, at 269; see also DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 237.
86 Ash, supra note 83, at 272-73.
87 See id. at 273; NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 222.
88 Ash, supra note 83, at 273-74.
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others, but their concerns were neglected locally.89 The dissenters
therefore sent a representative,John Ash, to England, to present their
cause to the Proprietors. 90 The Proprietors were unresponsive and
Ash died in an untimely fashion, but not before publishing a docu-
ment partly detailing the dissenters' plight.9 1 The Proprietors still re-
mained unsympathetic when approached by Joseph Boon, who had
been sent to replace Ash in his mission.
92
Following Ash's departure, the local government of the Carolinas
had further aggravated the situation by passing a statute barring relig-
ious non-conformers from sitting in the Commons House of Assembly
and requiring that each person elected to such office declare that he
is
of the profession of the Church of England, as established by law,
and that [he does] conforme to the same, and usually frequent the
said church for the publick worship of God;... and that [he is] not,
nor for one year past [has] not been, in communion with any
church or congregation that doth not conforme to the said church
of England, nor received the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in
such congregation . . .
It was this legislation that led to Defoe's involvement in the case on
behalf of the dissenters, first by addressing Parliament in his anony-
mous tract Party-Tyranny, written on behalf of Boon, 94 and then by
supporting their appeal to the Privy Council in The Case of Protestant
Dissenters.
The legislative deliberations leading up to the act excluding dis-
senters demonstrate that support for the enactment was not univocal.
Some of the arguments initially raised against the law by colonial legis-
lators who refused to endorse it even presaged the objections that De-
foe would later express. When the law was first proposed, the Charter
of the colony was brought forward, presumably to allow members of
the assembly to evaluate whether the act would be consonant with this
foundational document.9 5 Although the act passed despite this exam-
ination of the Charter, several legislators counted its existence among
the reasons why they refused to follow the judgment of their col-
leagues. One view, held by five members, was "[t]hat King Charles the
89 See DEFOE, PAwrv-TvPAN&y, supra note 46, at 247.
90 See id.
91 Id.; see also Ash, supra note 83 (containing this litany of complaints).
92 DEFOE, P'TY-TaRA'NNv, supra note 46, at 247.
93 An Act for the More Effectual Preservation of the Government of This Province
(1704), reprinted in STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 81, at 233.
94 See DEFOE, PAT-TvANNY, supra note 46, at 260.
95 See COMMONs HOUSEJOURNAL, May 4, 1704, at 239 (John S. Green transcript; micro-
film on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and Records) ("Ordered.
That the Grand Charter be laid before this House, which was accordingly.").
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2d having granted a liberty in the Charter, to the people for the set-
tling of this Collony, wee think the above Bill too great an infringe-
ment on the liege subjects of his majesty."96 Another member of the
assembly dissented "from the said Bill, it being contrary to the liberties
of the Inhabitants of this province granted by the Charter from his
Majestie to the Proprietors of this Province, which liberty hath en-
couraged many persons to transport themselves unto this Province.
9 7
Subsequent correspondence between various local officials, in-
cluding Nathaniel Johnson, Moore's successor as governor, and John
Archdale, himself a former governor of Carolina, who resided in En-
gland and became a proprietor by purchasing a share of the colony in
1705,98 further suggests that the exclusion act had succeeded in pit-
ting at least one of the proprietors against the government in Caro-
lina. Archdale's letters, and the responses to them, show that the new
proprietor expressed significant disapproval of the extremity of the
colony's measures, and that a rumor was circulating in Carolina that
Archdale himself-or even Boon-might be sent over to replace
Johnson as governor.99 According to the letters, some dissenters were
actually seated in the assembly after passage of the law excluding
them, but the entire group was soon sent home after disagreement
arose.100 Following the next election, all the prospective lawmakers
were obliged to qualify themselves by taking the oath prescribed by
the act, and replacements were sent to substitute for those who re-
fused to comply. 10 '
96 Id. at 240.
97 Id.
98 See 1 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY: A-C 38-39 (William S. Powell
ed., 1979) (entry on "John Archdale").
99 See Letter from John Archdale to a Friend Relative to Religious Toleration in Caro-
lina (Nov. 12, 1705/1706), in NORTH CAROLINA, GOV. JOHN ARCHDALE'S PAPERS item 7 (mi-
crofilm on file with the South Carolina Department of Archives and Records); Letter from
John Archdale to Nathan Johnson (n.d.), in Gov. JOHN ARCHDALE'S PAPERS, supra, at item
8; Letter from Job. Howe toJohn Archdale (Jan. 30, 1705/1706), in GOV.JOHN ARCHDALE'S
PAPERS, supra, at item 12; Letter from Nathdin Johnson to John Archdale (Jan. 10, 1705/
1706), in Gov. JOHN ARCHDALE'S PAPERS, supra, at item 31. For the rumor aboutJohnson's
possible replacement, see Letter from Nathan Johnson to John Archdale (Jan. 10, 1705/
1706), supra ("[H]e has advice that Yo[ur] Hon[our] designed either to come in person,
or to send mr. Boon over for governor: give me leave to assure Yo[ur] Hon[our], that you
shall be heartily welcome to me .... either in [the] capacity of a private person or proprie-
tor or gov. as shall likewise be any, who are fitting for such a station in this time of our
eminent and present dangers.").
100 See Letter from Job. Howe to John Archdale (Jan. 30, 1705/1706), supra note 99
("The churchmen gave [the] Dissenters opportunity Last Election to chuse what Assembly
men they pleas'd, & in [the] Beginning of this Month they satt, but in Two days every man
went to his own home, & [deserted] their Trust resolveing to heighten our differances, so
[the] Governor was forc'd to call another to sitt in March. .. ").
101 SeeJOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MARCH 6,
1705/1706-APmL 9, 1706 (A. S. Salley ed., 1937), at 6-18 (1705/1706).
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In Party-Tyranny, Defoe rejects the notion that the religious con-
flicts in the Carolinas were sui generis, in that they should be explained
and treated in isolation, and envisions the 1704 legislation as enabled,
in part, by the prejudices against religious dissenters prevalent in En-
gland.102 He clearly analogizes the situation in the Carolinas to the
one in England, where statutes against occasional conformity had at-
tracted great controversy, by calling the 1704 law in the Carolinas "an
Occasional Bill in Miniature."'0 3 He further maintains that the law
represented "a Compendium of Various Kinds of Oppressions prac-
tised on the English Subjects, by Fellow-Subjects in the Face of that
Government, which being Establish't on the Neck of Tyranny, has
openly declar'd against all sorts of Invasion of English Liberty.'
10 4
The Carolinas, he claims, were encouraged in their oppressive activi-
ties by the bad example set by England itself. 105 At the same time as
he attributes the genesis of the situation in part to the domestic re-
pression of religious dissenters, Defoe also infers domestic lessons
from the state of affairs in the Carolinas. Thus Defoe appears to pre-
sent his remarks not only on behalf of the colonists from Carolina, but
also more generally to the English Parliament and Queen on behalf of
domestic religious dissenters. As he extrapolates from the plight in
the Carolinas that he describes, "England may here see the Conse-
quence of Tackings, Occasional Bills, etc., in Miniature, and what the
Designs of the Party are in general, viz. the absolute Suppression of
Property, as well as Religion; or in short, both Civil and Ecclesiastical
102 Robert Weir's account suggests that Defoe's conclusion is not entirely far-fetched.
As he observes,
That the colonial act was modeled on the English bill does not of course
prove that it was instigated in London, but there are other reasons for be-
lieving that this was the case. One of the new Tory peers created at the
beginning of Queen Anne's reign was Lord Granville, who was not only a
proponent of the bill against occasional conformity, but also at this time the
proprietary palatine.
WEIR, supra note 69, at 78.
103 DEFOE, PAR-rv-Tw.ANNv, supra note 46, at 225. This interpretation was encouraged
by the language of the Carolina act itself, because the law premised its exclusion of dissent-
ers in part on the false representation that individuals with similar religious beliefs were
also prohibited from sitting in Parliament. See An Act for the More Effectual Preservation
of the Government of This Province (1704), reprinted in STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 81,
at 232 ("As nothing is more contrary to the profession of the Christian Religion, and partic-
ularly to the doctrine of the Church of England, than persecution for conscience only;
nevertheless, whereas it hath been found by experience that the admitting of persons of
different persuasions and interest in matters of religion to sitt and vote in the Commons
House of Assembly, hath often caused great contentions and animosities in this Province,
and hath very much obstructed the publick business; and whereas by the laws and usage of
England, all members of Parliament are obliged to conforme to the Church of England, by
receiving the sacrament of the Lord's Supper accor[ding] to the rites of the said
church ....").
104 DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 225.
105 Id. at 261.
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Tyranny." 10 6 By figuring the problem facing the dissenters in Caro-
lina as one related to a general trend of religious repression, Defoe
deploys the dissenters' difficulties in part to support his own efforts to
enforce limitations upon legislative power in England.1 0
7
In Party-Tyranny, Defoe's method of achieving such limitations re-
mains underdeveloped, and he relies primarily on Parliament to
check the local Carolina legislative authority. Defoe justifies the no-
tion that the colonists in Carolina should be able to depend on Parlia-
ment's protection by opining that the Carolina Assembly's power has
been rendered void by their disregard for the constitution of the col-
ony, and that, therefore, power has devolved back to its origin-in
other words, Parliament. 10 8 After first lauding the Constitution of
Carolina-stating that, if it "were rightly Administred, it may be al-
low'd the best Settlement in America"' 09-Defoe proceeds to explain
the consequences of the fact that the promise of the text has not been
carried out:
[W] hen any Body of Men Representative, or other Acting by, or for
a Constitution, from whom they receive their Power, shall Act, or
do, or make Laws and Statutes, to do anything destructive of the
Constitution they Act from, that Power is Ipso facto dissolv'd, and
revolves of Course into the Original Power, from whence it was
deriv'd.I1 0
Defoe's conception of this original power involves "the People," but
only insofar as they remain subjects of England: "[IT]he People with-
out doubt, by Right of Nature as well as by the Constitution, revolves
under the immediate Direction and Government of the English Em-
pire, whose Subjects they were before, and from whom their Govern-
ment was deriv'd."' l l According to this schema, engaging in acts that
106 Id.
107 A reference to the situation in the Carolinas in one of Defoe's contemporaneous
satires indicates how significant the conflict in the colony was to him. At the end of The
Consolidator, a work purporting to reflect the narrator's experiences on the moon, the nar-
rator appends a description of the lunar libraries, which (to his surprise) contain a number
of texts "[t]ranslated from our Tongue, into the Lunar Dialect, and stor'd up in their
Libraries with the Remarks, Notes and Observations of the Learned Men of that Climate
upon the Subject." See DANIEL DEFOE, TtE CONSOLIDATOR: OR, MEMOIRS OF SUNDRY TRANS-
ACTIONS FROM THE WORLD IN THE MooN. TRANSLATED FROM THE LUNAR LANGUAGE, BY THE
AUTHOR OF THE TRUE-BoRN ENGLISH MAN 349 (London, Bragg 1705). Included among
these volumes was "Ignis Fatuus, or the Occasional Bill in Minature, a Farce, as it was acted
by his Excellency the Lord Gr. .. its [Granville] Servants in Carolina." Id. at 358. As an
idiom, "ignis fatuus" translates as "something misleading"; thus, the presence of this work
in the lunar library, accompanied by commentary in hieroglyphics, further substantiates
Defoe's belief that other polities could learn valuable lessons from the events that took
place in the Carolinas.
108 DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 225-26.
109 Id. at 225.
110 Id. at 225-26.
111 Id. at 226.
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violate the constitution entails the immediate consequence of render-
ing legislative authority void and allowing power to revert to its origi-
nal locus; if that locus was (as Philip Hamburger notes in his
treatment of The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People) the
people themselves, 1 2 here it is Parliament, acting in its capacity as the
legislative authority over subjects throughout the English empire. Not
only are the particular acts themselves void because improper, but the
authority of the legislature itself is nullified because it passed legisla-
tion not in conformity with the constitutional scheme. Under this
model, judicial review is not required; instead, Defoe seems to assume
that the "original power" should simply recognize that a constitutional
breach has occurred and resume its supremacy.
Constitutional breach is, however, textually assessed even in Party-
Tyranny. Defoe first summarizes the constitutional documents of Car-
olina, the Charter and the Fundamental Constitutions, the latter of
which he attributes to John Locke.' 1 3 He continues by inquiring
whether the laws enacted by the colonial legislature
have the due Qualification requir'd by the Charter, viz.
1. To be consonant to Reason.
2. To the Utility of the Subject.
3. To the Preservation of Right and Property: The Words ex-
pressly set down in the Charter.
4. Whether if not, they are not void in their own Nature. 
1 4
For Defoe, the answer to the first three questions is, clearly, "no"; only
the response to the last seems to be affirmative. The questions them-
selves, however, demonstrate a particular stance on assessing the con-
stitutionality of legislation and the results of that assessment; Defoe
points to the text of the constitutional documents and "the words ex-
pressly set down in the Charter" as the source for the invalidation of
the colonial legislature's acts. Although Defoe appeals to the English
Parliament as the arbiter of the dispute, the crucial structural ele-
ments of his argument, from the vantage point of written constitution-
alism, consist in his eagerness to review legislation for conformity to
constitutional text and his assertion that a body outside the one be-
having anti-constitutionally should assume the task of redressing griev-
ances in such situations.
112 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113 DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNY, supra note 46, at 227-32. The extent of Locke's involve-
ment in authoring the Fundamental Constitutions is notoriously contested. See generally
David Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the "Two Treatises of Government," 32 POL. THEORY
602 (2004) (arguing for Locke's participation in the creation of the 1682 revision of the
Fundamental Constitutions, as well as the initial 1669 draft).
114 DEFOE, PARTY-TYRANNN, supra note 46, at 233.
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C. The Case of Protestant Dissenters
The colonists' petition to the House of Lords bore some fruit,
and the Carolina laws against which Party-Tyranny was, in part,
targeted, were eventually invalidated by the Privy Council in accor-
dance with the procedures that legal historians Mary Bilder and Jo-
seph Smith have outlined.' 5 Queen Anne approved a representation
115 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In this particular instance, Parliament,
upon receiving Boon's petition, heard legal arguments "in Defence of the said Acts." See
THE HUMBLE ADDRESS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL, IN
PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, PRESENTED TO HER MAJESTY, WITH HER MAJESTIES MOST GRAcIoUS
ANSWER THEREUNTO (1705/1706) [hereinafter THE HUMBLE ADDRESS]. The proprietors'
lawyer appears to have prepared himself for this episode by consulting the laws of other
colonies. See 18 B.P.R.O. JOURNALS B.T. 240 (March 7, 1705/1706) ("A gentleman from
the Lord Granville attending and desiring Leave to inspect the Virginia and Maryland
Laws, in order to prepare himself for a hearing that is to be on Saturday next before the
House of Lords upon two Acts past in Carolina: Leave was given him accordingly: And then
desiring Copies of two Acts past in Virginia in March 1661/2 Entituled Vestries appointed
and Ministers to be inducted, Copies of the said Acts were given him."). Once it had
resolved in favor of the dissenters, Parliament then addressed the Queen in March of
1705/1706, insisting that the "Act for the more effectual Preservation of the Government
of this Province" was "Founded upon falsity in matter of Fact," "Repugnant to the Laws of
England," "contrary to the Charter granted to the Proprietors," and "Tends to the Depopu-
lating and Ruining the said Province." SeeTHE HUMBLE ADDRESS, supra. After Queen Anne
then sent the case to the Board of Trade for its consideration, this body, upon consultation
with the Attorney General and Solicitor General, not only declared the laws "repugnant to
the Laws of England" and "not warranted by the said Charters," but even suggested that,
.as the making of such Laws is an abuse of the Power granted the said Proprietors of
making Laws, and will be a forfeiture of such Power; . . .your Majesty be pleased, to give
Directions for the reassuming the same into your Majestys hands by Scire Facias in the
Chancery or by Quo Warranto in your Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench." 29 B.P.R.O.
Propties B.T. 381 (May 24, 1705/1706). As Weir summarizes these transactions, "They
[the dissenters] were successful, and the House of Lords addressed the crown, asking it 'to
deliver the said Province from the arbitrary Oppressions under which it now lies'; the
crown referred the matter to the Board of Trade and its legal advisors..." Weir, supra
note 69, at 79.
Following notice of the disallowance of the two acts, the colonists proceeded to repeal
them and to enact an establishment of religion that Governor Johnson claimed would
serve the same function. JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, NOVEMBER 20, 1706-FEBRUARY 8, 1706/7, at 5 (Nov. 20, 1706) (A. S. Salley ed., 1939).
According to Johnson's address to the assembly,
When the Church is thus Settled [through a new act] I hope we Shall all be
happy by it, and as the Main end of passing the Act against the dissenters
was to Enable us the better to provide ffor the Safety of the Church of
England, so when the Church of England is Settled upon a ffirm and last-
ing ffoundation as is now proposed I Supose the Repealing the Act against
the dissenters can be no prejudice to us of the Church of England.
Id. Interestingly, Johnson had, in his earlier letter to Archdale, expressed a certain invest-
ment in allowing the colonists to repeal the bills themselves. AS he had written, alluding to
the possibility of disallowance of the acts, and referring to a law that Archdale himself had
passed, which "our people here think... gave them a great advantage in being judges of
repealing of their own acts," the question of whether the colonists themselves would be
given control over such a repeal "must be nicely managed." Letter from John Archdale to
Nathan Johnson (n.d.), supra note 99. Although no contemporaneous record exists of the
final text of the repeal bill, a subsequent version was included in Nicholas Trott's later
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from the Board of Trade-delegated by the Privy Council to opine on
colonial affairs-which stated,
that two laws, one for the establishment of religious worship, the
other compelling all members of Assembly to conform to the relig-
ious worship of the Church of England, are not consonant to reason
and [are] repugnant to the laws of England, and are therefore not
warranted by the Charters of 1663 and 1665, but were made without
any sufficient power or authority derived from the Crown of En-
gland, and therefore do not oblige or bind the inhabitants of the
colony .... 116
The official language of the Queen and the Board of Trade resonated
with the standard and general Privy Council rhetoric of repugnancy to
the laws of England; by comparison, Defoe offers an argument in The
Case of Protestant Dissenters that instead insists on the binding nature of
specific provisions of the Charter and Fundamental Constitutions.
Rather than directly invoking parliamentary support in this instance
(as he had a year before in Party-Tyranny), Defoe writes largely to a
judicial audience as well as to the general public.
The significance of the disparity between Defoe's argument and
the grounds for the Privy Council decision should not be underesti-
mated. Although the Privy Council did disallow legislation on the ba-
sis of colonial charters, in doing so it relied on general provisions
contained in these documents that required colonial legislation to not
be repugnant to the laws of England.1 7 Defoe, by contrast, empha-
sizes that the Charter and Fundamental Constitutions themselves pro-
vided specific protections for the liberties of the colonists that could
not be abrogated. Defoe thus does not resort simply to an appeal to
English law-or the Act of Toleration-but presents an argument
based upon the notion that the constitutional documents of Carolina,
by their own terms, required the colonial legislature to tolerate relig-
ious dissenters.
compilation of the colony's laws. An Act to Repeal the Several Acts within Mentioned
(1706), reprinted in STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 81, at 281. This text may, however,
represent an expurgated copy of the original, because an undated draft included in the
Archdale Papers contains language that much more explicitly condemns the laws being
revoked and insists upon the "rights" of the dissenters. See A Bill to Repeal an Act Made at
Charleston (May 6, 1704/1705), in NORTH CAROLINA, Gov. JOHN ARCHDALE'S PAPERS, supra
note 99, at item 25 ("[This] Act . . . very much infringes upon the native right and un-
doubted privileges of sundry the good [ ] inhabitants of this Province[,] Dissenters from
the Church of England[, w]ho on the terms contained in the Charter granted by our late
Gracious Sovereign King Charles the Second of blessed memory to the . . . Lords and
Proprietors of this province of enjoying freedom of opinion and practice in religious affairs
Transported themselves and familys into this Colony, here to settle and inhabit.").
116 THE PRIY COUNCIL, ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND: COLONIAL SERIES
506-07 (W.L. Grant et al. eds., 1910).
117 See BILDER, supra note 6, at 2; SMITH, supra note 6, at 465.
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The political conception sustaining The Case of Protestant Dissenters
draws together several strands of seventeenth-century social-contract
theory. Although the vision of the social compact that Locke
presented in his Two Treatises of Government may have later gained as-
cendancy in the popular imagination, other, quite distinct, variants of
the theory coexisted with it. According to Locke's model, the transi-
tion from the state of nature (in which all men are equal) to an organ-
ized and hierarchical political community occurs in two steps:' 1 8 first,
individuals join together by consensus to establish a society; second,
they convene and set up institutions by majority vote. For Locke, as
for Thomas Hobbes before him, the compact occurs between the indi-
viduals who constitute the political order. In Locke's theory, however,
unlike in Hobbes's, the right of resistance remains more societal than
individual, and the government's act of injuring the society as a whole
is more material than the burden that it places upon particular
individuals."19
Another thread of contractarian thought with roots stretching
centuries back located the contract between the King and his subjects.
According to this type of "constitutional contractarianism," which ini-
tially emphasized the obligations that the King incurred through his
coronation oath, the sovereign assumed particular duties in his agree-
ment to abide by the laws of the realm.' 20 Defoe's construction of
Queen Anne's promise to tolerate the dissenters arguably also fits
within this framework, but most constitutional contractarianism fo-
cused upon the speech acts occurring at the moment that the sover-
eign ascended the throne rather than subsequent to that point.
Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the constitutional con-
tractarian model assumed a more precise form, when William and
Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689 upon assuming the English
throne. As Robert Ferguson stated about this event in A BriefJustifica-
tion of the Prince of Orange's Descent into England, "[W] hatever there was
of an Original Contract between former Kings and the free People of
these Kingdoms, yet it is undeniable, there is a very formal and explicite
118 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT passim (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
119 Peter C. Myers, Locke on the Social Compact: An Overview, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
AND THE SOCIAL COMPACt 1, 18-19, 22-23 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds.,
2003).
120 Martyn P. Thompson, Locke's Contract in Context, in THE SOCIAL CoNrRAcr FROM
HOBBES TO RAWLS 73 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994); see also WILLIAM ATwOOD,
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT (London, 1690); ROBERT
FERGUSON, A BRIEF JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCE OF ORANGE'S DESCENT INTO ENGLAND
(London, Baldwin 1689).
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One between K. William and them."'12 1 The obligations entailed by the
customary oath of allegiance thus assumed an increasingly precise
form.
The Case of Protestant Dissenters itself commences with a fairly Lock-
ean emphasis on securing the liberty of the community by having
each individual "submit, that his own Actions as well as the Actions of
all others should be bound by a stated and certain Rule."1 22 It is this
"[f] reedorn of acting according to a known and stated Rule" that con-
stitutes liberty, and which all members of the community have an in-
terest in preserving.1 2 3 Liberty of conscience-or the ability of each
person to "believe what appears to him to be true, and to act pursuant
to his Belief in matters relating to another Life," unless he disturbs the
peace-is what Defoe represents as the foundational liberty.124 Even
in exigent situations where other liberties can be limited, a possibility
that Locke contemplated, Defoe insists that religious liberty cannot be
infringed.
125
Despite this initially Lockean presentation of the social compact,
Defoe moves toward constitutional contractarianism by focusing not
on the relationship among the colonists themselves, but between the
Proprietors and the people. In particular, Defoe claims that the laws
enacted by the colonial legislature contradict, and therefore breach,
an "Original Contract between the Proprietors and the People that
inhabit [the colony]."126 Defoe's theory of how the contract arises
differs with respect to the two documents in an important way:
whereas the people of the colony are seen as third-party beneficiaries
of the explicit agreement between the English sovereign and the Pro-
prietors of Carolina that the Charter embodies, the people more di-
rectly bound the Proprietors to the first set of Fundamental
Constitutions that they promulgated because the people accepted
121 ROBERT FERGUSON, A LETTER TO MR. SECRETARY TRENCHARD, DISCOVERING A CON-
spuIAcy AGAINST THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND: WITH REFLECTIONS ON THE PRE-
SENT PRETENDED PLOT 4 (n.p., 1694).
122 DEFOE, THE CASE OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS, supra note 47, at 3.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 4. Defoe's assertions can, in this respect, be fruitfully compared with Locke's
statements in the Second Treatise. Locke there insists that "whoever has the Legislative or
Supream Power of any Common-wealth, is bound to govern by establish'd standing Laws,
promulgated and known to the People." LOCKE, supra note 118, § 131, at 371. He also
provides, however, for the exercise of a prerogative power in certain exceptional circum-
stances, such as in the case of fire, "wherein a strict and rigid observation of the Laws may
do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent Man's House to stop the Fire, when the next to
it is burning)." Id. § 159, at 393. Defoe picks up the metaphor of fire, deploying it to
justify his interest in religious liberty in the Carolinas and maintaining that he must put out
the fires of persecution before they reach his own home, England. DEFOE, THE CASE OF
PROTESTANT DISSENTERS, supra note 47, at 6.
126 DEFOE, THE CASE OF PROTESTANT DISSEN'rERS, supra note 47, at 11.
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them. 127 In describing the genesis of both sources of obligation, De-
foe invokes the formalities of contract law much more than most sev-
enteenth- or eighteenth-century social contract theorists.
1 28
The Charter itself generates two successive contracts: as a grant
from the sovereign to the proprietors, it "is immediately a Contract
between the Sovereign and the Proprietors."'' 29 Because the sovereign
is acting as representative of "his Liege and Free People who shou'd
transplant themselves" to the colony, "and in Justice to those Inhabi-
tants who were already there," "all such Limitations of the Proprietors,
in favour of the People" should also, however, "be consider'd as tacit
Stipulations of the Proprietors with the People themselves. ' 130 The
people of the colony thus become third-party beneficiaries of the con-
tract between King and Proprietors. Although Defoe does not ex-
pressly invoke this contract doctrine, its existence in the common law
has been traced back well before the time of his intervention in
Carolina.1
31
Substantively, this meant that the law prohibiting religious non-
conformers from sitting in the colonial parliament should be invali-
dated based upon the Charter's statements about the process for
passing legislation. The Charter specified that the Proprietors could
"make, ordain and enact Laws; only of and with the Advice, Assent
and Approbation of the Freemen of the said Province, or of the
greater part of them, or of their Delegates or Deputys.' 32 Under the
new act, however, true representation of the "freemen of the prov-
ince" might never occur; a dissenter could be chosen by a majority of
the voters for each place in the colonial parliament and yet never be
seated because of the legislation prohibiting their participation in the
legislature. 133 As Defoe concludes, "this Act appears to be inconsis-
127 Id. at 30.
128 Defoe does not mention the Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Gr. Brit.),
which required that certain kinds of contracts-including those that could not be per-
formed within a year and those made in consideration of marriage-be in writing in order
to be enforced. The Statute of Frauds may, however, have formed another subterranean
influence on Defoe's conception of the written constitution.
129 DEFOE, THE CASE OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS, supra note 47, at 30.
130 Id.
131 While the inauguration of third-party beneficiary theory in contract law has often
been attributed to the 1680 English case Dutton v. Poole, similar decisions had, in fact, been
rendered throughout the seventeenth century; Dutton actually seemed to mark the decline
of the doctrine, in part because the 1677 Statute of Frauds required a writing in several
kinds of cases that had previously furnished the bulk of third-party beneficiary actions.
VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRiviTY A HISTORY OF THIR PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW 74-83 (1992). Despite the waning of third-party beneficiary
theory in the context of conventional legal contracts, it appears to have provided a compel-
ling source for Defoe's understanding of constitutional obligations.
132 DEFOE, THE CASE OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS, supra note 47, at 33 (emphasis
removed).
133 Id.
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tent with the Charter, in as much as, by virtue of it, Laws may be made
without the Advice and Consent of the Freemen, or their
Delegates." '
3 4
Defoe's argument with respect to the Fundamental Constitutions
bears more directly on particular provisions regarding religious lib-
erty. The Fundamental Constitutions of 1669, Defoe contends, consti-
tuted an act by which the Proprietors obligated themselves, not simply
by fiat, but by a type of contract to be performed upon acceptance. As
Defoe writes,
[T]he first Proprietors oblig'd themselves their Heirs and Succes-
sors to observe perpetually [the Fundamental Constitutions], in the
most binding ways that cou'd be devis'd, in case the People shou'd
accept 'em; if the People hereupon did accept 'em, they immedi-
ately became an express Contract between the Proprietors and the
People; and must necessarily be consider'd as such.
135
The oaths that new inhabitants and residents seeking office swore,
which required them to abide by the Fundamental Constitutions, con-
stituted the acceptance that transformed the Fundamental Constitu-
tions from a unilateral promise into a bilateral contract. 136 The
Fundamental Constitutions contained much more explicit protection
for religious liberty and the establishment of dissenting churches than
the Charter itself had; hence Defoe can argue, based upon them, that
"this Act that requires Men to be of the Profession of the Church of
England only, to make them capable of sitting in the Commons House
of Assembly, is a direct violation of these Fundamental
Constitutions."
1 37
Nor could, in Defoe's view, either the Charter or the Fundamen-
tal Constitutions be abrogated by the simple act of the Proprietors. In
the case of the Charter, it could be revoked only by the British sover-
eign; the Fundamental Constitutions were even more permanent, as
the Proprietors could "never become disengag'd, till all such of the
People, as have consented to 'em, consent to repeal 'em, in the same
manner in which they consented to them; that is to say, till they con-
sent to repeal them in Person."138 Only with this variety of popular
constitutional convention would a new set of "constitutions" be
created.
134 Id. at 34.
135 Id. at 30.
136 Id. at 30-31. The form of this contention resembled some of the colonists' earlier
strategies for resisting imposition of the later, 1682 version, of the Fundamental Constitu-
tions. See WEIR, supra note 69, at 66 ("The Goose Creek men refused to accept a revised
new draft.... In qualifying for earlier assemblies they had sworn, they said, to uphold the
Constitutions of 1669 and they could not possibly swear to the version of 1682.").
137 Id. at 36-37.
138 Id. at 31.
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The textual focus of Defoe's argument is underlined by the ar-
rangement of the pamphlet itself, which included an appendix con-
taining all of the relevant documents for the reader's perusal. This was
a technique that he employed relatively often, and the utility of which
is best shown by a tract reprinted in 1714 and entitled A Brief Surey of
the Legal Liberties of the Dissenters.139 This pamphlet contended that a
proposed bill against occasional conformity was inconsistent with the
Act of Toleration. In doing so, it instructed the reader in the task of
comparing the two pieces of legislation. Defoe asserts:
Before we go on to Examine what may, or not be deem'd an At-
tempt upon, and Inconsistent with the Religious Liberties of the Dis-
senters, it may be very useful for us to enquire what those Liberties
really are; to which Purpose, and that the Dissenters may know how
far those Liberties do or do not extend, and when they are or are not
Invaded, I believe it very much to the present Purpose to publish
the said Toleration Act at large, which, altho' it be put at the End of
this Tract, the Reader is desir'd to turn to it, and Peruse it before he
goes on any farther.
140
Addressing his reader as a potential dissenter, Defoe encourages him
to carry a pocket constitution, as it were, and apprise himself of the
text of his statutorily given rights. Defoe further instructs the reader
on how to perform an effective comparison of texts: rather than allow
the reader to wait until the end of his own argument to evaluate the
evidence, Defoe encourages him to read and inform himself of it
before assessing the merits of Defoe's position. Defoe's method of
interpretation is not, however, entirely literalist. A few pages later,
Defoe "compare [s] ... together" the two bills; although adopting the
form of quotation, this comparison is more conceptual than literal. 14'
As Defoe concludes the passage, "Thus the Toleration is preserv'd, and
not presero'd at the same Time. The Letter of the Toleration is preserv'd
in Deed, but the Substance and essential Parts are destroy'd.'
'1 4 2
Seeking a limit upon legislative authority, Defoe never settled
upon a solution adequate to restrict Parliament's own capacity; how-
ever, through analyzing the colonial context, he did discover a struc-
tural mechanism by which it would be possible to bind legislative
power: the written constitution. To this day, Defoe's England still
139 A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LIBERTIES OF THE DISSENTrERS: AND How FAR THE BILL
Now DEPENDING CONSISTS WITH PRESERVING THE TOLERATION INVIOLABLY: WHEREIN THE
PRESENT BILL IS PUBLISHED; AND ALSO THE TOLERATION AcT AT LARGE, THAT THEY MAY BE
COMPAR'D WITH ONE ANOTHER (Edinburgh, re-prtg. 1714).
140 Id. at 5.
141 Id. at 8.
142 Id.
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maintains a norm of parliamentary sovereignty, whereas in America,
Defoe's vision of constitutionalism has flourished.
III
THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION IN MINIATURE
Just as Defoe takes the plight of religious dissenters in the Caroli-
nas as an example "in miniature" of a problem facing England, his
literary writings furnish allegorical vignettes that elaborate the theory
of written constitutionalism. Whereas Defoe's political tracts adopt
the form of critique, positioning a written constitutional or quasi-con-
stitutional document as the most promising means for resisting legisla-
tive supremacy, his literary works instead provide a positive vision of
the virtues of constructing a community around a written constitu-
tional text and promote the possibility of such an approach to politics.
Thus, if Robinson Crusoe143 helped spawn the myth of modern individu-
alism (as Ian Watt has contended),144 Defoe's works of popular fiction
and history likewise helped to bolster the myth of written constitution-
alism. Writing already constitutes an act of some importance in Robin-
son Crusoe, as evidenced most prominently by Crusoe's reflections on
his struggles to continue his journal as his ink gradually runs out. Yet
it is the sequel, The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe,145 and Defoe's
compositions on pirates, that most concretely represent the written
inscription of a social compact.
A. Crusoe, Writing, and Contract
A number of scholars have interpreted Robinson Crusoe and The
Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe as presenting an allegory of indi-
viduals' emergence from the state of nature and entrance into the
social contract.1 46 As in the seventeenth century, when analogies be-
tween the social and the marital contracts proliferated, 147 Defoe's
treatments of (on the one hand) the union between husband and wife
and (on the other hand) the conjunction of members of the island's
nascent society mutually illuminate each other. And just as The Case of
Protestant Dissenters emphasized close analysis of the provisions of a
written charter and constitution, the representations of the marital
143 DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE, supra note 24.
144 See generally IAN WAIATT, MyFHS OF MODERN INDIVIDUALISM: FAUST, DON QUIXOTE,
DONJUAN, ROBINSON CRUSOE (1996).
145 DANIEL DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON CRUSOE (Tyndale House
1999) (1719) [hereinafter DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES].
146 See generally Maximillian E. Novak, Crusoe the King and the Political Evolution of His
Island, 2 STUD. ENG. LITERATURE, 1500-1900, at 337 (1962).
147 See generally VICTORIA KAHN, WAYWARD CONTRACrS: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL OBLIGA-
TION IN ENGLAND, 1640-1674 (2004).
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and social (or colonial) contracts in The Farther Adventures assume a
much more textual form than their seventeenth-century counterparts.
Writing had already been endowed with a certain significance in
Robinson Crusoe through Crusoe's attempt to memorialize his adven-
tures in a journal. While Crusoe begins by reporting events as they
unfold day by day, his dwindling supply of ink gradually forces him to
diminish the frequency of his journal entries and, eventually, to cease
recording events entirely.'4 8 While his ink lasts, it serves in part to
enhance memory. Hence Crusoe envisions his journal as providing a
"memorandum" of events-or literally, recording what must be
remembered. 49 Soon after his ink runs out, Crusoe describes a sub-
stitute form of inscription, one that involves the material world rather
than books: instead of memorializing in writing the fact that he had
constructed a canoe too big to put into the water, Crusoe explains
that he "was oblig'd to let [the canoe] lye where it was, as a Memoran-
dum to teach me to be wiser next Time." 1 50 In addition to supple-
menting memory, writing also enables Crusoe to correlate events
across time, as he states that
As long as [the ink] lasted, I made use of it to minute down the Days
of the Month on which any remarkable Thing happen'd to me, and
first by casting up Times past: I remember that there was a strange
Concurrence of Days, in the various Providences which befel me.'
5 1
Writing thereby allows Crusoe to engage in comparisons among re-
corded events.
Given Jean-Jacques Rousseau's interest in and ambivalence about
writing, 152 it is not surprising that his treatment of Robinson Crusoe
would implicate both the novel's own textuality and its representation
148 See DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE, supra note 24, at 76 ("A little after this my Ink began
to fail me, and so I contented my self to use it more sparingly, and to write down only the
most remarkable Events of my Life, without continuing a daily Memorandum of other
Things."); id. at 97 ("My Ink, as I observed, had been gone some time, all but a very little,
which I eek'd out with Water a little and a little, till it was so pale it scarce left any Appear-
ance of black upon the Paper . ).
149 Id. at 83.
150 Id. at 99.
151 Id. at 97.
152 It is well known that Rousseau at least explicitly places priority upon speech over
writing, viewing the latter as inferior to the immediacy of a hypothetically perfect form of
speech; at the same time, he values writing as potentially capable of capturing that which
inadequate speech was ineffectual at conveying. SeejACQUEs DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
141-42 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., corrected ed.,Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1998)
(1967) ("[Rousseau], straining toward the reconstruction of presence, . * . valorizes and
disqualifies writing at the same time. At the same time; that is to say, in one divided but
coherent movement .... Rousseau condemns writing as destruction of presence and as
disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the reappropriation of
that of which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed."). For Rousseau's reception of De-
foe, see JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION 77-79 (Allan Bloom trans., Ba-
sic Books 1979) (1762).
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of writing. 153 The presence or fullness that Rousseau idealizes and
associates with speech over writing forms a crucial component of his
theory in The Social Contract. The construction of the social contract,
for Rousseau, involves the alienation of each individual from the com-
munity, which, speaking as a totality, voices the general will.' 54 For
Rousseau, the sovereignty of the general will is never bound by "a law
which it cannot infringe.' 1 55 To the extent that the people are aggre-
gated into a unitary body, "there neither is nor can be any kind of
fundamental law binding on" them. 156 According to Rousseau's ac-
count, a written constitution would therefore be superceded in all
cases by a genuine act of the general will; this kind of constitutional
moment would overthrow any written document.1
57
Rousseau's treatment of Robinson Crusoe in Emile is in keeping
with his works' ambivalent relation to writing. The education that
Emile receives-that which Rousseau constructs as the ideal-is con-
spicuously devoid of books. Robinson Crusoe constitutes the one excep-
tion. 158 Although some scholars view Robinson Crusoe as a self-evident
choice, given Rousseau's desire to represent the education of the nat-
ural man, Denise Schaeffer has suggested instead that Crusoe is a "so-
cial man in isolation"' 59 and that Emile's tutor must introduce him to
Crusoe in order to engender self-reflection. 160 Crusoe's diary repre-
153 Denise Schaeffer, The Utility ofInk: Rousseau and Robinson Crusoe, 64 REV. POL. 121
(2002).
154 JEAN-JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. 1, ch. 6 (1762).
155 Id. ch. 7.
156 Id.
157 Derrida describes Rousseau as criticizing representation by placing priority on the
act of the general will; just as Rousseau was suspicious of writing because it deferred the
presence of its author, Rousseau prefers the voice of the sovereign people to any act of
their representative. DERRIDA, supra note 152, at 296. As Derrrida sees it,
Writing is the origin of inequality. It is the moment when the general will
which cannot err by itself, gives way to judgment, which can draw it into "the
seductive influences of individual wills .. " It is therefore absolutely neces-
sary that the general will express itself through voices without proxy. It
"makes law" when it declares itself in the voice of the "body of the people"
where it is indivisible.
Id. at 297. As Jed Rubenfeld further elaborates on this problem,
[H]aving posited that "the general will that should direct the State is not
that of a past time but of the present moment," Rousseau is obliged to
idealize the popular voice and the public tongue that would express this
will (the general will of the present moment could not be expressed in a
writing).
JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 47
(2001). Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments most powerfully articulates
how something like Rousseau's notion of the general will could be reconciled with the
written quality of the Constitution. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMtAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991).
158 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 152, at 77.
159 Schaffer, supra note 153, at 121.
160 Id. at 130-37.
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sents "the most important part of Defoe's novel for l mile" because it
shows the possibility of becoming "another self to oneself" by contem-
plating an earlier version of one's own identity. 16 1 The genre of the
diary or memoir-practiced by Rousseau himself in the Reveries-
thereby makes possible the writer's confrontation with his former self
and, in doing so, enables his self-consciousness.1 62 The context in
which Rousseau introduces and discusses Robinson Crusoe, renewing
the ambivalent stance that he assumes elsewhere about writing and
books, suggests the possibility that other members of Defoe's eight-
eenth-century audience would be influenced by his account of the dy-
namics of writing in the constitutional context.
The novel that most clearly presents a form of quasi-constitu-
tional writing and in which it is most transparently connected to a
colonial situation akin to that of the American colonies is, however,
not Robinson Crusoe, but rather its sequel, which appeared only months
after the original and was often printed with it.16 3 In The Farther Ad-
ventures of Robinson Crusoe, Crusoe is overtaken by the desire to journey
back to the colony that he had founded. He encounters, of course, a
variety of mishaps on the way (including a few foundering ships) and
winds up inviting the survivors of several disasters at sea onboard.
There are two moments in particular when a written agreement plays
a central role in the novel's development, one involving a marriage
contract and the other concerning the settlement of a government in
the colony. 164 These instances might appear quite disparate, but (as
Victoria Kahn has most recently elaborated in her book, Wayward Con-
tracts) analogies had often been drawn between marital and social
contracts during the seventeenth century. 165 In pairing the analyses
of marriage and government, Defoe thus draws upon a lengthy tradi-
tion. 166 Earlier versions of the analogy had not, however, displayed as
161 Id. at 145, 147.
162 Id. at 146-47.
163 See NOVAK, supra note 2, at 562 (stating that "[tihe first two parts [of the Crusoe
story] were often printed together; [the] third volume was ignored from the start").
164 See infra notes 171-91, 212-17 and accompanying text.
165 [I]n seventeenth-century England, as on the continent, the political rela-
tionship of subject and sovereign was regularly compared with marriage.
This model of contract preserved an older sense of status and natural hier-
archy while simultaneously addressing contemporary arguments for the vol-
untary nature of political obligation....
[W] ell before Hobbes elaborated his version of the original political
contract the language of the marriage contract was appropriated by both
royalists and parliamentarians in their debate over the conditions of legiti-
mate sovereignty.
KAHN, supra note 147, at 174-75; see also CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CON'rRACT (1988).
166 Nor did Defoe represent the end-point of the tradition. One can find invocations
of the analogy as late as John Quincy Adams' 1842 lecture, The Social Compact, Exemplified in
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE SOCIAL COM-
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much interest as Defoe's narratives in the extent to which either kind
of contract assumed a written form.
Although Crusoe speaks of his colony as a colony, he disclaims
having officially colonized it, and instead insists that he has assisted in
its formation as a kind of Lockean society emanating from the state of
nature.1 6 7 Locke himself had, as Jeremy Waldron has shown, pro-
vided two separate genealogies of political community, one taking the
form of political anthropology and the other of social contract the-
ory.168 Whereas the political anthropological account describes a
gradual "shift from inchoate patriarchal authority to formal political
institutionalization," the social contractarian account involves a sud-
den transformation of the state of nature into the political order.
169
Both of these models play their part in the formation of Crusoe's po-
litical community in the colony.
At several points in the narrative, Crusoe emphasizes his role as
that of a father to the polity that he has established. Rather than colo-
nizing subject to the will of the British king, he instead constructs him-
self as the father of the people whom he constituted into a state. As
PACT, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS: A
LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE FRANKLIN LYCEUM (Providence, Knowles & Vose 1842).
According to Adams, "the social compact, or body politic, founded upon the laws of Na-
ture and of God, physical, moral, and intellectual, necessarily pre-supposes a permanent
family compact formed by the will of the man, and the consent of the woman." Letter from
John Quincy Adams to Thomas L. Dunnell and William M. Rodman, Committee on Lec-
tures of the Franklin Lyceum, in ADAMS, supra, at 4. Elaborating upon the nature of this
marital compact, Adams insists that "[t]he nuptial tie of nature then must be formed by
mutual consent, but its permanency must be by the mutual pledge of faith, that is by cove-
nant or compact." ADAMS, supra, at 24.
As both Holly Brewer and Jay Fliegelman have shown, other aspects of the familial
relation-in particular, changing conceptions of paternity and childhood-provided pow-
erful analogies with and sources for reflection on the political situation in America around
the time of the revolution. See generally HOLLY BREWER, By BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN,
LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005); FLIEGELMAN, Supra note
28.
167 The notion of the island would assume significance in James Otis's 1764 attempt to
reconcile social contract theory with the colonial situation. SeeJames Otis, The Rights of the
British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in 3 THE RECEPTION OF LOCKE'S POLITICS 1 (Mark Goldie
ed., 1999). While Otis tries to disaggregate the individual's natural freedom from the fact
that he is born into society, he is obliged to acknowledge that "The truth is, as has been
shewn, men come into the world and into society at the same instant." Id. at 24. Because
the individual is born into society, he must first be isolated from it-like Crusoe-in order
to re-enter the state of nature before engaging in a new social contract. As Otis writes,
If in such case, there is a real interval between the separation [of an individ-
ual from "a society of which they have formerly been members"] and the
new conjunction, during such interval the individuals are as much de-
tached, and under the law of nature only, as would be two men who should
chance to meet on a desolate island.
Id. (emphasis added).
168 Jeremy Waldron, John Locke: Social Contract Versus Political Anthropology, in THE SO-
CIAL CoNrRAcr FROM HOBBES TO RAwLs, supra note 120, at 51.
169 Id. at 56.
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he explains, "I pleased myself with being the patron of the people I
placed there, and doing for them in a kind of haughty, majestic way,
like an old patriarchal monarch, providing for them as if I had been
father of the whole family, as well as of the plantation.' 1 70 At the same
time, however, Crusoe observes that the other individuals on the is-
land gradually agree to form a peaceful community, largely in order
to establish and protect private property.
In order to secure this community, Crusoe himself generates a
kind of charter-a document that is, conspicuously, written, a circum-
stance that derives additional significance from the fact that Crusoe
had pined for ink after his rescued store ran out in the original Robin-
son Crusoe. 17 1 As Crusoe recounts, the inhabitants
[D]esired one general writing under my hand for the whole, which
I caused to be drawn up, and signed and sealed, setting out the
bounds and situation of every man's plantation, and testifying that I
gave them thereby severally a right to the whole possession and in-
heritance of the respective plantations or farms, with their improve-
ments, to them and their heirs, reserving all the rest of the island as
my own property, and a certain rent for every particular plantation
after eleven years, if I, or any one from me, or in my name, came to
demand it, producing an attested copy of the same writing. As to
the government and laws among them, I told them I was not capa-
ble of giving them better rules than they were able to give them-
selves; only I made them promise me to live in love and good
neighbourhood with one another; and so I prepared to leave
them.
172
Although he leaves the decision about ordinary laws to the individuals
of the community, he insists upon the foundational conditions of
"love and good neighbourhood," then also urges upon them a prom-
ise that "they would never make any distinction of Papist or Protes-
tant ... and they likewise promised us that they would never have any
differences or disputes one with another about religion."1 7 3 Not only
the arrangements of property, but also the ground rules of govern-
ment are laid out within a document that resembles a charter or
proto-constitution. As in Defoe's political writings, however, the con-
tract does not eclipse the promise, but is instead supplemented by it.
170 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 152.
171 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
172 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 134. Defoe had foreshadowed
this development in the brief summary of his hero's future life provided at the end of
Robinson Crusoe; as Crusoe recounts, "I shar'd the Island into Parts with 'em, reserv'd to my
self the Property of the whole, but gave them such Parts respectively as they agreed on; and
having settled all things with them, and engaged them not to leave the Place, I left them
there." DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE, supra note 24, at 220.
173 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVEu-,rruRS, supra note 145, at 136.
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Writing also figures prominently in the attempts by a Catholic
French clergyman, whom Crusoe has rescued at sea, to formally marry
four of the lapsed Protestant English inhabitants who had captured
and "taken as . . wives" several natives. 74 Before Crusoe returned to
the island, various disputes had sundered the society, dividing both
the Spaniards resident there from the Englishmen and coming be-
tween the Englishmen themselves, some of whom are represented as
exceedingly lazy. On account of their slothfulness, some of the En-
glishmen decide to journey to the continent and enslave several na-
tives in order to delegate their work to others. 175 When they return
with a number of women, the Spanish governor seems most con-
cerned to avoid faction amongst the male colonists and insists that
[A] ll engage, that if any of you take any of these women as a wife, he
shall take but one; and that having taken one, none else shall touch
her; for though we cannot marry any one of you, yet it is but reason-
able that, while you stay here, the woman any of you takes shall be
maintained by the man that takes her, and should be his wife-I
mean," says he, "while he continues here, and that none else shall
have anything to do with her.
1 76
The allocation of a single "temporary wife" to each individual appears
designed to avert conflict among the members of the polity; as Victo-
ria Kahn and Carole Pateman have contended, the marriage covenant
may not, in early modern discourse, be one between man and wife,
but instead exists between men. 177 Not surprisingly, given the ar-
rangement (in which the women were never provided with even a
nominal opportunity to consent), Crusoe refers to the "temporary
wives" more as subjects or slaves than members of a marital commu-
nity.1 78 When the French priest appears on the scene, however, he
deems inadequate the kind of marriage undertaken by the society's
members and begins to try to persuade Crusoe to urge them to enter
into a more formal version of marriage.1
79
Crusoe and the French priest are impeccably polite to each other,
and each agrees to tolerate the other's religion without attempting to
174 Id. at 105. Defoe adopts a notably more tolerant attitude towards Catholics in this
work than elsewhere in his oeuvre. As Maximillian Novak has remarked, "For the most part,
Defoe's anti-Catholic attitudes remained a consistent element in his thinking throughout
his life, but during the brief interval during which the Crusoe volumes were written, Defoe
seemed to favour even the hated Catholic Church as an antidote to atheism and pagan-
ism." NOVAK, supra note 2, at 561.
175 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADvENTURES, supra note 145, at 58.
176 Id. at 63.
177 KAHN, supra note 147, at 206 (citing Carole Pateman's argument in The Sexual Con-
tract for the proposition that the marriage covenant is "a covenant between men" and dis-
cerning such a stance in John Milton's Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce).
178 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 105.
179 Id at 10..
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convert him.180 Although the English inhabitants of the island are no
longer devout, they seem to be ascriptively Protestant. The priest
therefore has qualms about performing marriages for the English col-
onists because the form of wedding that he would provide would inev-
itably bear the indicia of Catholicism.1 8 1 The solution that the priest
proposes to this quandary is to encourage the Englishmen to enter
into a written contract of marriage.' 8 2 The priest therefore instructs
Crusoe that he should
legally and effectually marry them; and as, sir, my way of marrying
may not be easy to reconcile them to, though it will be effectual,
even by your own laws, so your way may be as well before God, and
as valid among men. I mean by a written contract signed by both
man and woman, and by all the witnesses present, which all the laws
of Europe would decree to be valid. 18 3
In the face of the religious differences between the Englishmen on
the island and the Catholic missionary priest, the legalistic form of the
written contract becomes the mediating and effective instrument of
marriage.
When the conventions underlying the religious ceremony of mar-
riage are no longer sustainable because of the combination of varying
traditions, writing becomes the substitute. 184 Surprisingly, the priest
emphasizes the importance of a written marriage contract almost
180 As Crusoe recounts,
I was astonished at the sincerity and temper of this pious Papist... and it
presently occurred to my thoughts, that if such a temper was universal, we
might be all Catholic Christians, whatever Church or particular profession
we joined in; that a spirit of charity would soon work us all up into right
principles; and as he thought that the like charity would make us all
Catholics, so I told him I believed, had all the members of his Church the
like moderation, they would soon all be Protestants.
Id. at 122.
181 Id. at 106.
182 Id. at 107.
183 Id. at 107.
184 The religious eclecticism of the Robinson Crusoe story and its ecumenical quality
were emphasized by an early parody. In this tract, which consists of an imagined dialogue
between Defoe himself and his characters Crusoe and Friday, Crusoe complains to the
author about the lack of uniformity in his own religious position throughout the novels
and his seeming tolerance of Catholics:
Thus, all the English Seamen laugh'd me out of Religion, but the Spanish
and Portuguese Sailors were honest religious Fellows; you make me a Protes-
tant in London, and a Papist in Brasil; and then again, a Protestant in my
own Island, and when I get thence, the only Thing that deters me from
returning to Brasil, is meerly, because I did not like to die a Papist; for you
say, that Popery may be a good Religion to live in, but not to die in; as if that
Religion could be good to live in, which was not good to die in .... But
tho' you keep me thus by Force a Sort of Protestant, yet, you all along make
me very fond of Popish Priests and the Popish Religion ....
CHARLES GILDON, THE LIFE AND STRANGE SURPRIZING ADVENTURES OF MR. D- DE F-
(London, 1719), excerpted in DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE, supra note 24, at 257, 259.
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more than that of a religious ceremony; only this written marriage
contract can both adequately express the consent of the parties and
bind them in the future. Thus the Frenchman opines that
[T]he essence of the sacrament of matrimony ... consists not only
in the mutual consent of the parties to take one another as man and
wife, but in the formal and legal obligation that there is in the con-
tract to compel the man and woman, at all times, to own and ac-
knowledge each other.1
8 5
Although the Englishmen may have been temporarily excused from
the obligation of entering into this written contract by their circum-
stances and because they lacked "any pen and ink, or paper, to write
down a contract of marriage, and have it signed between them," that
situation has been remedied and the arrival of ink on the scene means
that they must officially marry. 186 Nor is it adequate for the women to
remain in the state of involuntary submission to which the first form
of marriage had consigned them; instead, the priest says that they
must now be persuaded to convert to Christianity and consent to the
marriage-a consent that it is extremely difficult to envision as freely
given under the circumstances.
18 7
While describing to his "temporary wife" the reasons why they
should be formally married, Will Atkins, heretofore one of the most
recalcitrant of the Englishmen, himself echoes the French priest's ra-
tionale, citing the binding nature of the marriage compact; as Will
reports the conversation to Crusoe, he "first told her the nature of our
185 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 105-06.
186 Id. at 105.
187 Id. at 116. Defoe's other writings do not give any encouragement to the notion that
equality will miraculously follow the marriage either. In his novel Roxana, the title charac-
ter attempts to dissuade a suitor from the desire to marry her by expressing the notion that
this arrangement will inevitably render her a subject to him, the sovereign. See DANIEL
DEFOE, ROXANA, OR, THE FORTUNATE MISTRESS (John Mullan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996)
(1724) [hereinafter DEFOE, ROXANA]. Although Roxana represents herself as resisting the
suitor for other reasons, her proto-feminist objections to the institution of marriage are
persuasively phrased:
I told him, I had, perhaps, differing Notions of Matrimony, from what the
receiv'd Custom had given us of it; that I thought a Woman was a free
Agent, as well as a Man, and was born free, and cou'd she manage herself
suitably, might enjoy that Liberty to as much Purpose as the Men do; that
the Laws of Matrimony were indeed, otherwise, and Mankind at this time,
acted quite upon other Principles; and those such, that a Woman gave her-
self entirely away from herself, in Marriage, and capitulated only to be, at
best, but an Upper-Servant ....
[W]hile a Woman was single, she was a Masculine in her politick
Capacity; that she had then the full Command of what she had, and the full
Direction of what she did ....
Id. at 147-48. According to this account, marriage divests a woman of her "politick capac-
ity" and renders her a mere servant; Roxana even refers at one point to a woman's husband
as her "monarch." Id. at 150.
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laws about marriage, and what the reasons were that men and women
were obliged to enter into such compacts as it was neither in the
power of one nor other to break." 8 8 When Will then details to her
the Christian conception of God, and explains that "God has spoken
to some good men in former days, even from heaven, by plain words;
and God has inspired good men by His Spirit; and they have written
all His Laws down in a book,"1 89 his wife becomes fascinated with the
notion of this book and refuses to rest until she has been given a phys-
ical copy of the Bible.1 90
In this context, the written obligation seems to assume, for Defoe,
a more binding quality than the spoken word. In addition, it demon-
strates an ability to replace the rituals or ceremonies of a particular
tradition with a medium more capable of including and reconciling
disparate cultural contexts.' 9 1 Writing therefore takes on a special sig-
nificance within the multi-denominational colonial setting that Defoe
describes.
B. Pyrates, the Polity, and Constitutional Review
A number of Defoe's other literary works, as well as his less fic-
tionalized General History of the Pyrates, turned to what was, at the time,
the paradigmatic situation of the individual isolated from conven-
tional society and its norms: the pirate. 9 2 In both his novelistic and
188 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 125. A work Defoe published
in 1727, entitled A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed, similarly insists
on the permanence of the marriage contract as well as other features that render it less like
an ordinary contract and more akin to a constitution. According to Defoe, the marriage
contract creates a new unity out of parts that were previously disparate: "Matrimony is not a
single Act, but it is a Condition of Life, and therefore when People are new-married, they
are said to have altered their Condition; it is a Series of Unity contracted . . . ." DANIEL
DEFOE, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE MARRIAGE BED 44 (London,
Warner 1727). Rather than being a temporary condition, it is, for him "not a Branch of
Life only, but ... a State, . . . a settled Establishment of Life, and an Establishment for a
continuance at least of the Life of one of the two." Id. at 30. Finally, like a constitution,
the marriage contract does not merely mark the moment of the parties' transition between
conditions but more importantly structures the relation in which they continue to exist.
See id. at 29, 44, 54. Failing to abide by the limitations implicit in the marriage contract
"dishonour[s]" the contract itself, even if no one is capable of enforcing these limitations
from outside the confines of the couple itself. Id. at 44.
189 DEFOE, THE FARTHER ADVENTURES, supra note 145, at 129.
190 Id. at 129, 137.
191 The cultural context of the native women whom the English colonists "marry" is
not, however, incorporated and is instead effaced by their conversion to Christianity. This
aspect of the plot shows the significant limitations of Defoe's inclusiveness and, by implica-
tion, of his conception of written constitutionalism. Many scholars have performed post-
colonial readings of Defoe's work-in particular, Robinson Crusoe-that develop critiques of
his representation of native populations; but the most compelling such reading may be
J.M. Coetzee's novel Foe. See generallyJ.M. COETZEE, FOE (1987).
192 Defoe's novelistic and "historical" work overlaps more than a contemporary reader
might expect-indeed, some of his fictions employed the designation "histories" and were
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more historical accounts of piracy, Defoe focused upon the political
status of the pirate, conceived as an individual who leaves behind the
bonds of society and enters into an alternative social compact from
the standpoint of the state of nature. 93 In the 1719 novella The King
of Pirates, composed of two letters from the notorious Captain Avery
(and purportedly published, in part, to dispel misapprehensions
about the pirate's career), Defoe presents the portrait of a collectivity
bound together in a manner reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes's
description of the genesis of political community. The pseudonymous
General History of the Pyrates, the two volumes of which appeared in
1726 and 1728, represents a range of piratical communities and pro-
vides a more detailed account of the political organization of one, in
particular. This account describes the pirates' agreement to found a
society on the seas, whose norms would be enshrined in a set of quasi-
constitutional "Articles," the interpretation of which would devolve to
those citizen-subjects who formed the people of the common-
wealth. 194 These piratical political orders, and the Articles that
formed their guiding principles, more fully presaged the written con-
stitutionalism of the American polity than the other kinds of social
compact that Defoe represented. Rather than simply benefiting the
people in perpetuity, the piratical Articles were formed as the marker
of the compact into which a number of self-liberated subjects entered.
As Defoe continually emphasized, the pirates taken collectively consti-
tuted both the source and the beneficiaries of the Articles; in this re-
spect, they provide a paradigm for democratic constitutionalism.
Captain Avery's purported letters, the main text of The King of
Pirates, present themselves as disabusing the public of the false, ro-
mance-like accounts that they have received of the narrator, replacing
these fictions with his true story-one in which he is, of course, a
much more sympathetic figure, who eschews cruelty and generally en-
only retrospectively classified as novels. This is perhaps because, as Lennard Davis has
written, "When Robinson Crusoe was written in 1719, there was no clear distinction between
news and fiction, and Defoe's work rests uneasily in that world of a discourse which is more
and more inclining to separate into two subdiscourses but which still has not broken
apart." LENNARD J. DAVIS, FACTUAL FICTIONS: THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL 155
(1983). Be that as it may, the close relationship between what we would designate as De-
foe's novels and his historical writings justify treating them together.
193 As Maximillian Novak and others have observed, Defoe tends to romanticize the
pirates' polity, removing reference to some of the more bloody exploits in which they may
have been engaged. See NOVAK, supra note 2, at 582 (explaining that "Defoe tends toward
building his own mythology of piracy," one that verged on the utopian); Manuel
Schonhorn, Defoe's Captain Singleton: A Reassessment with Observations, 7 PAPERS ON LAN-
GUAGE AND LITERATURE 38 (1971) (discussing how Defoe softened the violence of piracy in
his narratives).
194 For the most thorough extant account of Defoe's description of this constitutional
scheme, see Lee A. Casey, Pirate Constitutionalism: An Essay in Self-Government, 8J.L. & POL.
477 (1992).
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dorses principles of democratic equality among his crew.195 Captain
Avery was, in fact, a historical personage-Captain Henry Every
(1653-96)-but the "historical" reports of pirates at the time con-
tained such embellishments that separating fact from fiction remains
almost impossible. The Preface from the "Publisher" of The King of
Pirates-presumably Defoe himself-alludes to this situation, as well as
to the reasons for the indistinction of fact and fiction in this area:
[T] his may be said, without any arrogance, that this story, stripped
of all the romantic, improbable, and impossible parts of it, looks
more like the history of Captain Avery than anything yet published
ever has done; and, if it is not proved that the Captain wrote these
letters himself, the publisher says none but the Captain himself will
ever be able to mend them.
196
As this passage indicates, one of the principal difficulties in develop-
ing an accurate account of the pirates' escapades lay in the fact that in
many cases, the pirates themselves were the only available eye-wit-
nesses to their activities. Narratives about the pirates were thus
obliged to rely either on rumor or, as many parts of Defoe's later His-
tory of the Pyrates did, on the reports of the pirates' trials;19 7 it is doubt-
ful that a full or accurate version of the pirates' narratives would
emerge out of this kind of forensic context.
The commonwealth of pirates that Avery describes in his letters
partakes of a modified Hobbesian vision.' 98 If, for Hobbes, men enter
into the social compact out of the fear that they experience in the
state of nature, ambition and avarice set Avery and his compatriots
upon their piratical adventures. 199 Fear and the goal of self-preserva-
tion do, however, play a central role: as Avery comments early on, "for
self-preservation being the supreme law of nature, all things of this
195 DANIEL DEFOE, THE KING OF PIRATES 7 (Peter Ackroyd ed., Hesperus Press 2002)
(1719) [hereinafter DEFOE, KING OF PIRATES]. In particular, Defoe undermines the notion
that Captain Avery had raped and murdered the Mogul's daughter and become King of
Madagascar. Id. at 5-6. The King of Pirates has generally been attributed to Defoe, but
some skeptics remain. In Daniel Defoe, Maximillian Novak treats the text as definitely de-
rived from Defoe and as providing a template for the subsequent novel Captain Singleton.
See NovAK, supra note 2, at 580-83. Furbank and Owens, however, remain unconvinced.
See FURBANK & OWENS, supra note 47, at 122.
196 DEFOE, KING OF PIRATES, supra note 195, at 6.
197 DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PxRATs 665-95 (Manuel Schonhorn
ed., Dover Publications 1999) (1724) [hereinafter DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE
PYRATES]. The origins of this work, the original edition of which listed "Captain Charles
Johnson" as the author, have been the subject of much scholarly speculation. The evi-
dence of Defoe's authorship derives largely from parallels with his other writings. SeeJohn
Robert Moore, Defoe in the Pillory and Other Studies (1939), in IND. U. PUBLICATIONS HUMAN.
SERIES (1939-1941), No. 1. But cf. FURBANK & OWENS, supra note 47, at 133-34.
198 In his forward to the Hesperus edition, Peter Ackroyd comments that "The world
of The King of Pirates is a desperate one .... It is the world of Hobbes' Leviathan trans-
ported to the high seas." DEFOE, KING OF PIRATES, supra note 195, at ix.
199 Id. at 8.
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kind must submit to that."200 The passion of fear also enters into the
community at the prospect of the dissolution of the commonwealth
that has been formed. Once Avery enters into the service of Captain
Redhand, who not only attacks the vessels of foreign nations but is "at
war with all mankind," the danger of disbanding increases. 20 1 When
the pirates contemplate doing so, and consider tryinging to "by de-
grees reduce [themselves] to a private capacity," they fear that one
among them will betray the others. 20 2 They therefore determine that
there is
no safety for us but by keeping all together, and going to some part
of the world where we might be strong enough to defend ourselves,
or be so concealed till we might find out some way of escape that we
might not now be so well able to think of.
203
The ultimate result is their establishment in Madagascar, from whence
Avery disseminates a rumor that he will help all pirates and buc-
caneers who find him there to settle and form new towns in the col-
ony he has created.
20 4
The pirates' polity was, however, established well before they ar-
rived in Madagascar. As Avery's narrative continually emphasizes, the
pirates resolved important issues through mutual consent and even
elected him captain democratically. 20 5 At one point, Avery found
himself "by the unanimous consent of all the crew, made captain of
200 Id.
201 Id. at 10.
202 Id. at 30.
203 Id.
204 As Avery, disguised as one of his own minions, informs a group of Englishmen
whom he captures and holds for a few days before sending them off again,
If any gang of pirates or buccaneers would go upon their adventures, and
when they had made themselves rich would come and settle with us, we
would take them into our protection and give them land to build towns and
habitations for themselves-and so in time we might become a great na-
tion, and inhabit the whole island. I told them the Romans themselves
were, at first, no better than such a gang of rovers as we were, and who
knew but our General, Captain Avery, might lay the foundation of as great
an empire as they.
Id. at 75.
205 Defoe confirms in A General History of the Pyrates that the captain, although endowed
with unquestioned authority in times of emergency, generally remains a representative of
the community rather than an individual placed above it, like a king. As Defoe writes of
the selection of a new captain, paraphrasing one of the crewmembers, "it was not of any
great Signification who was dignify'd with Tide; for really and in Truth, all good Govern-
ments had (like theirs) the supream Power lodged with the Community, who might doubt-
less depute and revoke as suited Interest or Humour." DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE
PYRATES, supra note 197, at 194. As the man continues, recalling Defoe's own statements
about the location of the original power in disparate political settings, "We are the Original of
this claim.., and should a Captain be so sawcy as to exceed Prescription at any time, why down with
him!" Id. at 194-95.
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the great ship and of the whole crew. ' 20 6 When they later encoun-
tered a group of buccaneers, these latter sailors decided to join Avery
and his companions, and, in order to do so, "they sent us word they
had chosen [Avery] .. .unanimously for their captain. '20 7 Allotments
of money, and determinations about whether individuals should be
allowed to abandon the enterprise, likewise depended upon general
consent.20 8 The entire crew is thus described as "one body"-like the
body politic of the Leviathan.
2 0 9
This body politic was not in continual flux, entirely governed by
the pirates' shifting moods. Instead, it was secured, like Robinson
Crusoe's colony, by one central law-one that, not surprisingly, con-
cerned the distribution and regulation of the wealth that they had
acquired. As Avery explained:
Here also we shared our booty, which was great indeed to a
profusion, and as keeping such a treasure in every man's particular
private possession would have occasioned gaming, quarrelling, and
perhaps thieving and pilfering, I ordered that so many small chests
should be made as there were men in the ship. And every man's
treasure was nailed up in these chests, and the chests all stowed in
the hold, with every man's name upon his chest, not to be touched
but by general order. And to prevent gaming I prevailed with them
to make a law or agreement, and everyone to set their hands to it.
By which they agreed that, if any man played for any more money
than he had in his keeping, the winner should not be paid whatever
the loser run in debt, but the chest containing every man's dividend
should be all his own to be delivered whole to him. And the of-
fender, whenever he left the ship, if he would pay any gaming debts
afterward, that was another case, but such debts should never be
paid while he continued in that company.
2 10
According to this account, equal allocation of the acquired prize
would be the only surety against strife or dissension amongst the
group. The implicit justification for prohibiting gambling is likewise
the diminution in a particular individual's wealth-and the resulting
conflict-that it would occasion. This theme reappears in similar
terms in Captain Singleton, another of Defoe's novels loosely based
206 DEFOE, KING OF PIRATES, supra note 195, at 25.
207 Id. at 26.
208 See id. at 12 ("NT]hey all approved it with a general consent, and I had the honour
of being the contriver of the voyage."); id. at 78 ("When this was agreed, they resolved to
take no money out of the grand stock, but to take such men's money as were gone and had
left their money behind, and this being consented to truly, my friends took the occasion
and took all their own money, and mine ... and carried it on board.... ."); id. at 80 ("They
did not leave us without our consent .... ").
209 Id. at 26 ("Accordingly we did so, and gave them that ship with all her guns and
ammunition, but made one of our own men captain, which they consented to, and so we
became all one body.").
210 Id. at 26-27.
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upon the life of Captain Avery; in that narrative, upon the discovery of
gold, Captain Singleton formulates a similar strategy by which to fore-
stall distributive conflicts and prevent gambling.
211
Nor is it incidental that the resolution takes the form of a "law or
agreement." Although it is not specified in The King of Pirates whether
the law is written, The History of the Pyrates elaborates much more ex-
plicitly on the written character of the "articles" formulated under
Captain Roberts. These provide a paradigmatic example because the
legal system of which they formed a part was, Defoe claimed, "pretty
near the same with all Pyrates."2 12 Defoe sets forth the content of "the
Substance of the Articles, as taken from the Pyrates' own Informa-
211 While we were eating, it came into my thoughts that while we worked at this
rate in a thing of such nicety and consequence, it was ten to one if the gold,
which was the make-bait of the world, did not, first or last, set us together by
the ears, to break our good articles and our understanding one among an-
other, and perhaps cause us to part companies, or worse; I therefore told
them that I was indeed the youngest man in the company, but as they had
always allowed me to give my opinion in things, and had sometimes been
pleased to follow my advice, so I had something to propose now, which I
thought would be for all our advantages, and I believed they would all like
it very well. I told them we were in a country where we all knew there was a
great deal of gold, and that all the world sent ships thither to get it; that we
did not indeed know where it was, and so we might get a great deal, or a
little, we did not know whether; but I offered it to them to consider whether
it would not be the best way for us, and to preserve the good harmony and
friendship that had been always kept among us, and which was so absolutely
necessary to our safety, that what we found should be brought together to
one common stock, and be equally divided at last, rather than to run the
hazard of any difference which might happen among us from any one's
having found more or less than another. I told them, that if we were all
upon one bottom we should all apply ourselves heartily to the work; and,
besides that, we might then set our negroes all to work for us, and receive
equally the fruit of their labour and of our own, and being all exactly alike
sharers, there could be no just cause of quarrel or disgust among us.
They all approved the proposal, and every onejointly swore, and gave
their hands to one another, that they would not conceal the least grain of
gold from the rest; and consented that if any one or more should be found
to conceal any, all that he had should be taken from him and divided
among the rest; and one thing more was added to it by our gunner, from
considerations equally good and just, that if any one of us, by any play, bet,
game, or wager, won any money or gold, or the value of any, from another,
during our whole voyage, till our return quite to Portugal, he should be
obliged by us all to restore it again on the penalty of being disarmed and
turned out of the company, and of having no relief from us on any account
whatever. This was to prevent wagering and playing for money, which our
men were apt to do by several means and at several games, though they had
neither cards nor dice.
DANIEL DEFOE, CAPTAIN SINGLETON 79-80 (Dodo Press 2005) (1720)
212 DEFOE, A GENERAL HIsToRY OF THE PYRATES, supra note 197, at 213. Defoe refers to
similar articles, although with much less elaboration, elsewhere in A General History of the
Pyrates. In talking about Captain Howel Davis, he writes that, "As soon as he was possess'd
of his Command, he drew up Articles, which were signed and sworn to by himself and the
rest, then he made a short Speech, the sum of which was a Declaration of War against the
whole World." Id. at 167-68. The reader subsequently discovers at least part of the con-
tent of the articles, which specify that "he who first espies a Sail, if she proves a Prize, is
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tions."213 Testimony substituted for the written document itself here,
because only the pirates could be privy to the latter; as Defoe observes,
the pirates "had taken Care to throw over-board the Original they had
signed and sworn to."'2 14 These articles were therefore written not for
the purpose of promulgation but rather to fix certain principles for
the duration of the society. Hence, the justification for adopting
them was that, "finding hitherto they had been but as a Rope of Sand,
they formed a Set of Articles, to be signed and sworn to, for the better
Conservation of their Society, and doing Justice to one another."
21 5
Not only did the original pirates swear to abide by these articles, but
any newcomer was obliged to do so as well; the articles "were together
the Test of all new Comers, who were initiated by an Oath taken on a
Bible, reserved for that Purpose only, and were subscribed to in Pres-
ence of the worshipful Mr. Roberts. '21 6 True to Hobbesian theory,
however, Roberts did not base the belief that these articles would con-
strain the pirates solely on faith in their oath; as Defoe observes, "he
thought their greatest Security lay in this, that it was every one's Inter-
est to observe them, if they were minded to keep up so abominable a
Combination. '" 2 17 Self-interest therefore played a part equal to, if not
greater than, honor in this quasi-constitutional structure.
In part, the content of the articles echoes both the laws estab-
lished in The King of Pirates and Captain Singleton and the guiding prin-
ciples of the society in The Farther Adventures. The first rule, however,
is that of democracy, establishing that "Every Man has a Vote in Affairs
of Moment";2 1 8 within this first article is also contained a guarantee
that, except in cases of scarcity, each person has "equal Tide" to the
provisions obtained and may freely enjoy them.2 1 9 Equal participation
in decision making, rapidly followed by the ability to provide for physi-
cal necessities, are thus the foundational principles established by the
articles. Violations of the commonwealth, such as desertion in battle,
or defrauding the general fisc, were punished severely. 22 0 Further-
more, no man was even supposed "to talk of breaking up their Way of
Living, till each had shared a 1000 1."221 Maintaining the community
was thus another priority under the articles. Finally, the articles
entitled to the best Pair of Pistols on board, over and above his Dividend, in which they
take a singular Pride." Id. at 191.
213 Id. at 211.
214 Id. at 213.
215 Id. at 210.
216 Id. at 213.
217 Id. at 210.
218 Id. at 211.
219 Id.
220 Marooning or death was the fate of those who had defrauded the company as a
whole or who had attempted to desert the company. Id. at 211-12.
221 Id. at 212.
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shared with Captain Avery's laws the prohibition against gambling,
and with Robinson Crusoe's community the fear of the division within
the polity that might result from the introduction of women.
222
Whereas this latter difficulty was resolved in The Farther Adventures by a
compact among the men to resist making attempts upon each others'
wives, it is dealt with in the articles by prohibiting women from being
carried on board at all.
223
The method that Defoe sparsely describes of interpreting these
laws provides some insight into the potential for written constitution-
alism to involve something other than judicial review, despite Chief
Justice Marshall's assertion of an inevitable relation between the two.
Instead, as Defoe explains, "[I]n Case any Doubt should arise con-
cerning the Construction of these Laws, and it should remain a Dis-
pute whether the Party had infringed them or no, a Jury was
appointed to explain them, and bring in a Verdict upon the Case in
Doubt."224 In this way, interpretation would be accomplished by some
of the same individuals who had concocted and signed the articles.
Although Defoe acknowledges that doubt might arise about the mean-
ing of the text, the pirates' solution was not to appoint a particular
expert or authority, but rather to allow the decision about interpreta-
tion to be returned to members of the crew itself.
2 25
This interpretive method also entails examining the meaning of
terms in a manner that would be accessible to such a jury of pirates.
Defoe therefore lauds the fact that the pirates' trials involved "no tor-
turing and wresting the Sense of the Law, for bye Ends and Purposes,
no puzzling or perplexing the Cause with unintelligible canting
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 213.
225 The novel Roxana also includes a scene suggesting the extrajudicial enforcement of
certain written agreements. Having been deserted by her first husband, Roxana-still
technically married-is romantically approached by her landlord, whose wife has also left
him. DEFOE, ROXANA, supra note 187, at 41. The man proposes to contract a quasi-mar-
riage with Roxana and, as she recounts,
[S]hew'd me a Contract in Writing, wherein he engag'd himself to me; to
cohabit constantly with me; to provide for me in all Respects as a Wife; and
repeating in the Preamble, a long Account of the Nature and Reason of our
living together, and an Obligation in the Penalty of 7000 1. never to aban-
don me; and at last, shew'd me a Bond for 500 1. to be paid to me, or to my
Assigns, within three Months after his death.
Id. at 42. Roxana accepts, announcing that she will depend upon his promise. Id. at 43.
After the man meets an untimely death at the hands of highway robbers, Roxana does not
invoke the terms of the contract but instead engages in self-help based upon her private
agreement with him, claiming to have been married to him in France without knowing
that he already possessed an English wife. Id. at 55-57. The written contract, despite being
arranged only between the parties and never introduced in a court of law, thereby retains
significance because it legitimates Roxana's own efforts to recover money from the man's
estate.
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Terms, and useless Distinctions. ' 226 Subsequently, when he recounts
some of the pirates' trials for piracy itself at the hands of an admiralty
court on the coast of Africa, Defoe describes the judicial body as far
from versed in law yet capable of interpreting statutory language and
reaching a just result. 227 The court therefore gives substantial consid-
eration to "those Words in the Act of Parliament, of, particularly specfy-
ing in the Charge, the Circumstances of Time, Place, &C.," 2 2 8 despite the
circumstance that "the Country . .. [was] exempted from Lawyers,
and Law-Books. '229 The tools of interpretation, on this account,
stretch beyond the boundaries of the recognized institutions of law.
The rotation of interpretive authority in the judgment of the pi-
rates is paralleled by the rotation of judicial authority in a game
played by another group of pirates, tied to Captain Anstis. Occupying
their leisure while awaiting a response to their petition for pardon,
these pirates entertained themselves through mock trials, in which
they would alternately assume the roles of judge and condemned:
"they appointed a Mock-Court of Judicature to try one another for
Pyracy, and he that was a Criminal one Day was made Judge an-
other."23 0 Although a game, this mock court revealed an important
aspect of piratical law: the interchangeability of judge and judged.
Defoe likewise lauds the actual act of judicature accomplished when
some of Captain Roberts' company deserted, partly because the de-
fendants in the case "were arraigned upon a Statute of their own mak-
ing." As he writes, "Here was the Form of Justice kept up, which is as
much as can be said of several other Courts, that have more lawful
Commissions for what they do."2 31 Thus, those composing the laws
are those applying them; those judging could well be those judged;
and those being judged have made the very law by which they are
condemned.
IV
THE MYTH OF WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Today, written constitutionalism has assumed mythic status as a
political ideal to which nearly all aspire and is viewed as bringing sta-
bility and order to hitherto chaotic governmental regimes. In the es-
tablishment of this myth, Defoe played a heretofore-unappreciated
role. Defoe's prolific writings exerted influence over a vast range of
subsequent political thinkers as well as the modern public's self-con-
226 DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES, supra note 197, at 222.
227 Id. at 250.
228 Id. at 249.
229 Id. at 248.
230 Id. at 292.
231 Id. at 222.
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ception. 232 Furthermore, Defoe either provided or presaged most of
the critical normative arguments that can be offered to support the
notion that writtenness constitutes an important, and even essential,
aspect of constitutionalism. Although they diverge in emphasis, De-
foe's arguments for written constitutionalism are cognate with both
ChiefJustice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury and contemporary schol-
ars' discussions of the subject. This Part details six aspects of written
constitutionalism that have been promoted:
1) promulgation;
2) durability;
3) documenting a social contract;
4) limiting legislative power;
5) interpretive methods; and
6) judicial review.
Whereas Defoe's writings rely largely on the first four of these quali-
ties, contemporary constitutional law often focuses on the final two.
Defoe's early championing of written constitutionalism thus shows a
slightly different set of bases for valuing it than those provided either
by Chief Justice Marshall's conjunction of writtenness and judicial re-
view or by the tenor of academic discussions today.
The aspect of written constitutionalism that appears most salient
to Defoe-that of promulgation-is perhaps least considered in the
contemporary context. The fact of writing, for Defoe, renders a docu-
ment accessible to each person for perusal, evaluation, and compari-
son with other practices-or, more importantly, with other relevant
texts. Defoe appends the actual text of the relevant legal documents
to several of his political pamphlets, whether charters or statutes;
233
moreover, he calls our attention to the precise formulations of these
texts, at one point even interrupting his argument to instruct the
reader to turn to the relevant statute before continuing.23 4 In A Seri-
ous Inquiry, when he relies on Queen Anne's promise to tolerate the
religious dissenters and insists that it should prevent contrary Parlia-
mentary legislation, Defoe emphasizes the number of people who had
heard this speech. 23 5 Although a public address may reach a multi-
tude (especially when made by the Queen), writing by its very nature
has the potential to be received even more broadly and disseminated
beyond the confines of a particular ceremony. Furthermore, for De-
232 As Ian Watt has shown, Robinson Crusoe was, from the eighteenth century onward,
"appropriat[ed] .. . for different, and indeed often contradictory, ideological purposes,"
WATt, supra note 144, at 180, by thinkers ranging from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Karl
Marx, id at 172-80.
233 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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foe, the reach of writing binds those who have promulgated the writ-
ing more than a simple declaration would. The Proprietors of the
Carolinas had extensively advertised the virtues of their colony, em-
phasizing not only its natural bounty but also the political and relig-
ious privileges that they were willing to grant settlers; these documents
had exerted an influence of unknown extent in encouraging people
to move to the colony.23 6 Because of their written representations, the
Proprietors were, in Defoe's view, estopped from removing the
vaunted privileges they had described. 237 Precisely because of its un-
moored promulgation to a wide range of recipients who relied upon
it, writing therefore generates a more pronounced obligation than
speech.
This obligation is also, for Defoe, more durable than one orally
generated. Scholars have often debated whether a written or unwrit-
ten constitution should prove more lasting. An unwritten constitu-
tion, the argument goes, both ensures adherence to abstract
principles better than a written document with manipulable clauses
and, by avoiding brittle rigidity, remains in place because it can more
easily adapt to new circumstances; a written constitution, the counter-
argument goes, itself embodies permanence through the durability of
the text. As Jed Rubenfeld has elaborated, the fact that a constitution
is written implies a particular relation to temporality, one that values
not the immediacy of a social compact emanating from the present
and spoken will of the people, but rather one that views the most sig-
nificant act of a democracy as the creation of a commitment over
time.238 For Rubenfeld, the very fact that a constitution is written en-
tails temporal extension: "Written constitutionalism breaks from the
premise that self-government ideally consists of government by the
will or consent of the governed at any given moment. It begins rather
with the idea of self-government as a temporally extended project. '2 3 9
Defoe similarly emphasizes the durability entailed by writing. As he
explains in relation to the Charter and Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, present majorities cannot abrogate the obligations that the
Proprietors assumed through them, partly because these obligations
inure to the benefit of future generations as well. 240 For Defoe, writ-
ing therefore imports a new level of constitutional commitment.
A focus on durability leads to the question of what exactly en-
dures. One answer insists that the Constitution memorializes in writ-
ing a particular social compact. Accounts of the effect of America's
236 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
238 See RUBENFELD, supra note 157;Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104
YALE L.J. 1119 (1995).
239 Rubenfeld, supra note 238, at 1144.
240 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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separation from England upon the pre-existing social compact have
taken two forms. According to the first, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence abrogated only the second part of the Lockean contract, that
establishing the particular form of government. Under this explana-
tion, the colonies continued as states; the institutions of government
that had previously depended upon the Crown were simply en-
shrined-or not, in the cases of Rhode Island and Connecticut-in
written state constitutions. 2 4  According to the second, the American
Revolution reduced the colonies to a state of nature, from which it
became possible to enter into a formalized social compact, articulated
"in concrete terms. '242 Under this explanation, the metaphorical ver-
sion of contracting that came to explain the genesis of written consti-
tutions on both the state and federal levels envisioned the people as
coming together on their own behalf in order to leave the state of
nature and form a society. As Gordon Wood has elaborated, this con-
ception entailed that "the existence of society itself depended upon a
concrete charter or constitution. '" 243 Although contractual reasoning
had been employed during the colonial period to explain the mutual
obligations that the King and colonists owed each other, the form of
social compact theory that held sway 'in late-eighteenth-century
America abrogated this dualistic model and replaced it with a single
source of authority, that of the people. 244 If colonial charters were
grants from the King in favor of the people, the Constitution itself
constituted "the charter or compact of the whole people." 24 5
The perceived need for formalization of the contract on the na-
tional level emanated out of increasing distrust of the unchecked ex-
ercise of legislative power after 1776.246 Having objected for so long
241 See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 39-41.
242 Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
51, 69 (2003). In his article, Harrington relies on Justice William Patterson's statements
about the written constitution in Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (Pa.
1795), maintaining that "Paterson's formulation of the role of a written constitution is
significant .... [I]t confirms the view that American constitutions are different from the
English in that they are explicit social compacts, agreed to by 'the people themselves' at a
definite and fixed time." Id. at 71; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 282-91 (1969) (explaining the transition in American
thought to the notion of a social compact entered into by a people who had been thrust
into the state of nature).
243 See WOOD, supra note 242, at 288.
244 See id. at 269, 268-73 (describing the "contract between rulers and people" between
the English King and American subjects under which "protection and allegiance became
the considerations"); id. at 282-91 (explaining the new version of contract theory that
supervened).
245 Id. at 284 (quoting Thomas Paine, Candid and Critical Remarks on a Letter Signed
Ludlow (1777)).
246 SeeJack N. Rakove, Once More into the Judicial Breach, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 381, 383
(2003) ("Why, after all, did Americans come to think of a written constitution in such
exalted terms? There are multiple answers one could give to this question. But high on
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to the abuse of the King's power, post-revolutionary Americans were
obliged to rediscover the problems that legislative authority itself
could generate. Thomas Tucker's 1784 South Carolina pamphlet
Conciliatory Hints (which Leslie Friedman Goldstein has argued repre-
sents the first expression of the need for a written constitution to
check legislative power) explains the nature of the social compact or
covenant embodied in a constitution deserving of the name and then
elaborates how such a constitution should be constructed so as to set
enforceable limits upon legislative power.247 As Tucker wrote of the
constitutional compact:
In a true commonwealth or democratic government, all authority is
derived from the people at large .... The constitution is a social
covenant entered into by express consent of the people, upon a
footing of the most perfect equality with respect to every civil lib-
erty.... No man has surrendered any portion of his natural free-
dom, except the liberty of refusing to contribute his equal share of
personal and pecuniary service for the common benefit. This he
gives up in exchange for the valuable consideration of receiving
protection both in person and property against the evil disposed
part of his fellow citizens or a foreign enemy, and of partaking the
advantages of all civil regulations.
248
This account positions the people both as the source of obligation
and as the ones obliged. Nor can elected representatives exceed the
boundaries pre-ordained by the constitution. Generally, Tucker ex-
plains, the people act through representatives, who are "invested
with .. .certain powers."249 With respect to these legislators, Tucker
maintains that:
Whilst they confine themselves within the limits prescribed, their
act is the act of the people. But when they exceed their bounds and
any historically grounded explanation of this process must lie the recognition that Ameri-
can constitutionalism, in its formative period, was shaped by an adverse reaction to the
received doctrine of legislative supremacy that was part of the legacy of English constitu-
tionalism. That reaction, however, was driven less by an intellectual repudiation of the pre-
1776 assertion of parliamentary authority over America than by a new consideration of the
uses to which legislative power could be put. That consideration became evident only after
independence, as American legislatures converted this general principle into a working
description of how republican governments would actually operate."); see also Leslie Fried-
man Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins ofJudicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten
Law, 48J. POL. 51 (1986) (describing a movement during this period away from the idea
that the legislature can be considered equivalent to the people); Wood, supra note 3 (not-
ing the decline in faith in the legislature and increasing faith in the judiciary during the
1780s).
247 See WOOD, supra note 242, at 280-82; Goldstein, supra note 246, at 61-62, 64.
248 PHILODEMUS (THOMAS TUDOR TUCKER), CONCILIATORY HiNTs, ATTEMPTING, BY A
FAIR STATE OF MATTERS, TO RE.oVE PART PREJUDICE (Charleston, 1784), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 606, 612-13
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
249 Id. at 613.
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violate the conditions of their appointment, their acts are no longer
binding, and they are accountable to their constituents for a
traiterous abuse of trust. But the terms of the compact or constitu-
tion should be so contrived, as to provide a remedy, in all such
cases, without outrage, noise or tumult. If tumultuous measures are
necessary to procure redress, in any case of grievance whatever, it is
owing to a fault in the original compact.
250
Thus the terms of the constitutional compact, when well formed, both
curb legislative over-reaching and obviate the need for the people to
resort to revolutionary solutions when confronted with violations of
the social compact. The written constitution thus provides a substi-
tute for revolution, just as did judicial review in its early
incarnations.
25'
For Defoe, the Charter and Fundamental Constitutions of Caro-
lina likewise represent distinctively written social contracts, ones that
modify the bilateral structure typically identified with early colonial
charters and associated with the constitutional contractarianism
thought to govern relations between the King and his subjects, and
which place more emphasis on writing than earlier social contract the-
ory. On the one hand, in The Case of Protestant Dissenters, Defoe argues
for benefits to the colonists based upon the Charter and Fundamental
Constitutions that do not simply depend upon the colonial proprie-
tors' protection of the colonists' rights. 252 Through these arguments,
the colonists are constructed in a fashion that renders them predeces-
sors to the "people" of the American republic. Although they have
not, on Defoe's account, joined together to create a compact ex nihilo,
they are the recipients of the privileges provided by several compacts
through their individual and successive agreements to emigrate to the
Carolinas; therefore, they derive their rights in a more permanent and
inalienable form than if these rights were simply granted directly to
them by the King.
Similarly, and even more radically, in his History of the Pyrates, De-
foe provides an account of the social compact among the pirates that
is memorialized in a set of "articles," a quasi-constitutional document
that details the sailors' rights and obligations and also structures the
political community in which they partake. 25 3 In discussing these arti-
cles and the formation of political authority based upon them, Defoe
explains that, although one individual is elected captain and en-
trusted with leading the expedition, he does not thereby assume an
250 Id. at 614.
251 See SNOWIss, supra note 3; Wood, supra note 3, at 796-99.
252 See supra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
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unlimited executive power but is only delegated the authority that the
articles have deemed advisable.
25 4
Defoe also modifies seventeenth-century social contract theory
significantly by foregrounding the role of writing. Even constitutional
contractarianism, which had posited that the King's coronation oath
to abide by the laws of the realm bound him to respect certain funda-
mental rights of his subjects, relied on the sovereign's oral rather than
written representations. 255 Defoe instead emphasizes the actual text
of the quasi-constitutional documents and insists upon its importance.
Taking up a prevalent seventeenth-century analogy between the
marital and social contracts, Defoe places a similar priority upon the
written marriage contract in The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe.
In this context, the merit of writing appears to consist in its ability to
bridge disparate religious traditions and obviate the necessity for a
ceremony based upon one rather than another. If the ritual structure
and even efficacy of the speech act emanates from particular custom-
ary traditions, writing, for Defoe, enables a free-floating formality that
does not depend for its success on the presence of ambient cultural
conditions other than literacy.
Defoe's social contractarianism, like that of the Founding genera-
tion, also emanates largely out of an effort to limit exercises of legisla-
tive power. Many of the struggles of the seventeenth century-from
King James I's arguments for a status above the law, to the English
Civil War, to the Glorious Revolution-had involved royal attempts to
assert supremacy and the resistance posed against this effort by the
judiciary, Parliament, or the people. By the time of Defoe's major
writings in the early eighteenth century, however, parliamentary sover-
eignty had virtually been established. Defoe, like some at the found-
ing moment, appears to have harbored doubts about the merits of
endowing the legislature with power to this extent. As a religious dis-
senter himself, Defoe was particularly concerned with the potential
for legislatures to oppress members of religious minorities. For him
then, a social contract embodied in a written constitution emerges as
a valuable limitation upon the scope of parliamentary power.
Unlike many contemporary scholars who espouse a social con-
tractarian vision of the Constitution, Defoe did not derive a specific
method of interpretation from the fact of writtenness. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, among others, reads Chief Justice Marshall's argument in
Marbury and its notion of written constitutionalism as "impl [ying] a
particular methodology of constitutional interpretation: originalist
254 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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textualism."256 Paulsen derives this conclusion from Chief Justice
Marshall's insistence that the Constitution is supreme: according to
Paulsen's interpretation, "[T]he whole idea that the Constitution is
supreme ... presupposes that there is some objective meaning to the
Constitution that stands on its own, apart from the interpretations or
applications of that document by any particular actor. The Constitu-
tion means what it means. ' 257 This objective meaning, Paulsen as-
sumes, can be ascertained by applying an originalist textualist
method.
258
By contrast, Defoe provides few comments on interpretive meth-
ods, except insofar as he often advocates comparing the texts of a
quasi-constitutional document with the legislation that supposedly
conflicts with it.259 This procedure, he presupposes, will lead to an
accurate assessment of whether a particular law has, in fact, been con-
stitutionally passed. The notion that one could compare the language
of two documents and arrive at a conception of their compatibility
does, of course, imply the possibility of deriving some meaning from
the texts; but this meaning does not necessarily appear determinate
for Defoe. In his General History of the Pyrates (one of the rare works in
which he treats legal interpretation), Defoe describes procedures for
evaluating the meaning of the constitutive articles in cases of doubt.
Although he disparages legalistic quibbling, and describes the allot-
ment of interpretive authority to the community itself (in the form of
juries composed of a collection of pirates), Defoe acknowledges that
the meaning of the quasi-constitutional texts may be subject to inter-
pretation. Likewise, in a 1714 pamphlet, he gestures toward consider-
ing the "spirit" rather than the "letter" of a law, and paraphrases its
postulates in such a way as to ask whether its general thrust, rather
than its particular language, is compatible with the earlier Act of Tol-
eration. 2 60 Legal interpretation is not, therefore, entirely literalist ac-
cording to Defoe's account, nor will the import of legal provisions
always be self-evident.
Those whom Defoe assigns the task of interpreting are also multi-
ple. Some scholars today, following Chief Justice Marshall, insist that
the written nature of the Constitution of necessity implies judicial re-
view. 261 Although The Case of Protestant Dissenters is presented in the
256 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MiCH. L. REv. 2706,
2725 (2003).
257 Id. at 2739 (emphasis omitted).
258 Id. at 2740.
259 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
260 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
261 For a contemporary argument for judicial review based, in part, upon the written
nature of the U.S. Constitution, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 887, 914-21 (2003). Jeremy Waldron has, by contrast,
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context of an appeal to the Privy Council, Defoe does not insist on
judicial review per se and instead places this practice within the
broader field of constitutional interpretation.2 62 For Defoe, the bind-
ing nature of a written agreement entails not only that the judiciary or
the people can acknowledge the violation of particular terms, but
even that the original parties should recognize when they have failed
to conform to their obligations. Thus, in the novel Roxana, a couple
engage in a "private" marital agreement-despite the fact that both
are already married to other people-that would probably never be
upheld in a judicial tribunal but nevertheless obliges the respective
parties.2 63 When this type of self-enforcing version of the written
agreement fails, however, Defoe does view other actors in the political
arena as capable of intervening; hence, he appeals first to Parliament
in Party-Tyranny and then to the Privy Council in The Case of Protestant
Dissenters to invalidate the acts of the colonial legislature in the Caroli-
nas, and he describes the pirates who had created the articles asjudg-
ing their comrades in accordance with them. Judicial review, while
encompassed within Defoe's scheme, therefore remains a component
of a broader range of interpretive activities; while judicial review is
certainly contemplated by Defoe's work, it does not furnish the exclu-
sive or even predominant method of enforcing written constitutions.
CONCLUSION
In political tracts and literary works from the early decades of the
eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe prefigured many of the arguments
for written constitutionalism that would subsequently emerge as sali-
ent in the context of the Constitution. However, rather than associat-
ing written constitutionalism ineluctably with judicial review or a
contended that the institution ofjudicial review is separable from the presence of a written
constitution. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1366 (2006) ("[T]here is a distinction both at the cultural and at the institutional
level between a commitment to rights (even a written commitment to rights) and any par-
ticular institutional form (e.g., judicial review of legislation) that such a commitment may
take.").
262 As Michael Warner has argued, Marshall's views on this point may not even have
accorded with those prevalent at the time of ratification. According to Warner,
The republican ideology of print eroded, and an official hermeneutics
emerged....
Between the legitimating drama of sovereignty that gave rise to the
Constitution and the official hermeneutics that resulted from it, the mean-
ing of the document's writtenness had been transformed. The transforma-
tion was not recognized as such, but was regarded as a restatement of
republican principles. A good example isJohn Marshall's decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison, where he appeals to the Constitution's writtenness in order
to argue that hermeneutics gives the law exactly in the act of receiving the
law.
WARNER, supra note 35, at 114.
263 See supra note 225.
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particular type of interpretation, Defoe instead envisioned a written
constitution as one that is capable of embodying a particular form of
social compact. Some aspects of the myth of written constitutionalism
that Defoe emphasized have waned in significance. Simultaneously,
Defoe's most famous account of the social compact, Robinson Crusoe,
has been the subject of almost innumerable adaptations. By returning
to the original of the myth of written constitutionalism, we can best
discern the version appropriate for today-and the adaptation of
Robinson Crusoe for our time.
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